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I. Introduction 
The phrase, “what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the 
gander,” is familiar not just to Parisian-trained restaurant chefs. 
Along with its American cousin,1 the phrase has long found a 
settled home in the English lexicon as a shorthand way of 
imparting a principle of general equality—it is, to the idiom 
scholar and daily conversationalist alike, “something that you say 
to suggest that if a particular type of behaviour is acceptable for 
one person, it should also be acceptable for another person.”2 It 
seems that the phrase’s culinary heritage comes from the 
supposedly evident notion that the sauce one would serve with a 
dish of cooked female goose is no different than the one expected 
to be served with a dish of cooked male goose.3 Given this fowl 
ancestry, the phrase, unsurprisingly, was once understood as 
connoting equality just between sexes.4 It has long since acquired 
                                                                                                     
 1. “What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.” See CAMBRIDGE 
IDIOMS DICTIONARY 167 (2d ed. 2006) (identifying “good for” substitution 
(replacing “sauce for”) as an “American & Australian old-fashioned” recasting of 
the earlier British saying). 
 2. See id. (offering the illustrative usage example: “If your husband can go 
out with his friends, then surely you can go out with yours. What’s sauce for the 
goose is sauce for the gander.”). 
 3. See Answer to What Does the Saying ‘What Is Sauce for the Goose Is 
Sauce for the Gander’ Mean?, ANSWERS BLOG, http://wiki.answers.com/ 
Q/What_does_the_saying_‘What_is_sauce_for_the_goose_is_sauce_for_the_gand
er’_mean?feedback=1 (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (“This saying comes from 
cooking - you don’t make sauce for the male goose and sauce for the female - you 
make one sauce.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). If this 
discussion has whetted your appetite for goose, the Thomas Jefferson 
Foundation offers you a recipe for a colonial sauce. Leni the Cook, Jefferson-Era 
Recipe: Sauce for a Goose, MONTICELLO (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://www.monticello.org/site/blog-and-community/posts/jefferson-era-recipe-sa 
uce-goose (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 4. A “goose” is “any of various long-necked, web-footed, wild or domestic 
waterfowl that are like ducks but larger, especially, a female . . . [as] 
distinguished from a gander.” WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED 
DICTIONARY 787 (2d ed. 1983). A “gander,” conversely, is “a male goose.” Id. at 
752. Evidently, the British iteration of the saying finds its origins in John Ray’s 
1670 publication Catalogue of Proverbs, where he, parenthetically, characterized 
it as “a woman’s proverb.” See STUART FLEXNER & DORIS FLEXNER, WISE WORDS 
AND WIVES’ TALES: THE ORIGINS, MEANINGS AND TIME-HONORED WISDOM OF 
PROVERBS AND FOLK SAYINGS OLDE AND NEW 159 (1993) (“That that’s good sawce 
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its contemporary, far broader application—anything that’s fair 
for you, ought to be fair for me.5  
Though old fashioned, the phrase has made something of a 
modern revival of late in the fascinatingly tumultuous world of 
post-“Twiqbal”6 federal pleading practice. The U.S. Supreme 
Court in Twiqbal announced that federal claimants may not 
plead in a cursory, conclusory fashion, but must instead supply 
enough facts in their pleadings to “‘nudge[] [their] claims’ . . . 
‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”7 This whole 
business of “plausibility” has left courts and scholars in quite a 
state of anxiety.8 And it has created a fair measure of uncertainty 
                                                                                                     
for the goose, is good for a gander.” (quoting JOHN RAY, CATALOGUE OF PROVERBS 
98 (1670)); see also E.D. HIRSCH, JR., JOSEPH F. KETT & JAMES TREFIL, NEW 
DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 57 (3d ed. 2002) (defining the saying as 
follows: “What is good for a man is equally good for a woman; or what a man can 
have or do, so can a woman have or do”). Some contend the saying actually may 
have even earlier roots, traced back to John Heywood’s A Dialogue Conteinyng 
the Nomber in Effect of All the Prouerbes in the Englishe Tongue (“As well for 
the coowe as for the bull”), though it was given wide circulation in Roger 
L’Estrange’s 1692 translation of Fables of Aesop (“Sauce for a Goose is Sauce for 
a Gander”). See FLEXNER & FLEXNER, supra at 159 (discussing the origins of the 
phrase). 
 5. See MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN IDIOMS AND PHRASAL VERBS 
750 (Richard A. Spears ed. 2005) (explaining the saying to mean: “What is good 
for one person is good for another”). Elsewhere, the phrase’s definition has been 
explained by illustration. For an example of such an illustration, see Ken 
Greenwald, What’s Sauce for the Goose, WORDWIZARD (Dec. 13, 2004, 8:25 AM), 
http://www.wordwizard.com/phpbb3/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=23699 (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Greenwald 
defines the phrase to mean the following:  
What is appropriate for one person is equally appropriate for another 
person in a similar situation; sometimes used in the context of sexual 
equality: If smoking is banned on the factory floor then it should also 
be banned in the boardroom—what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for 
the gander.  
 6. “Twiqbal” has become the clever, handy abbreviation to refer 
collectively to the U.S. Supreme Court’s two recent federal pleading decisions in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009). See, e.g., RHJ Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of DuBois, 754 F. Supp. 2d 
723, 730 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (identifying “Twiqbal” as how the Supreme Court’s 
Iqbal and Twombly decisions are now “commonly known”). 
 7. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  
 8. See, e.g., McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 624 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Hamilton, J., dissenting in part) (“Iqbal’s reliance on the fact/conclusion 
dichotomy is highly subjective, and returns courts to the long disapproved 
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for plaintiffs struggling to decode the right way to plead 
“plausibly.”9  
But the pleading stage does not end with the claim. The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe that defending parties 
must counterplead, with their answer, to the claim’s 
accusations.10 In doing so, must a defending party’s answer 
confront this brave new world of “plausibility” pleading? Should 
defending parties have to “nudge” their defenses across the line 
into “plausibility” in the same way that claimants must nudge 
their complaints? Isn’t that the fair and just thing to require? 
After all, in the words of several of the federal district judges who 
have weighed in on this issue already, isn’t “what is sauce for the 
goose sauce for the gander”?11 
                                                                                                     
methods of analysis under the regime of code pleading.”); Courie v. Alcoa Wheel 
& Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Exactly how implausible is 
‘implausible’ remains to be seen.”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to 
Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 
23–26 (2010) (decrying the “plausible” standard’s instruction that courts rely on 
“judicial experience and common sense” as “highly ambiguous and subjective 
concepts largely devoid of accepted—let alone universal—meaning”). 
 9. See, e.g., PAUL BATISTA, CIVIL RICO PRACTICE MANUAL § 2.06 (2013) 
(discussing the Court’s “important, but unclear,” Twombly opinion, and 
surmising how a civil RICO complaint might survive the “plausibility” inquiry); 
MICHAEL DORE, LAW OF TOXIC TORTS § 10:1 (2012) (“While courts will 
undoubtedly reach a variety of conclusions with respect to whether toxic tort 
complaints meet the Iqbal plausibility standard, it is clear that the basis for 
resolving this question will be very different than it has been in the past.”); 
DANA SHILLING, LAWYER’S DESK BOOK § 18.01 (2012) (“The plaintiff’s bar says 
that Iqbal demands specificity that is often impossible until after discovery.”); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 460 (2008) 
(suggesting the Supreme Court “has seemingly turned its back on the liberal 
ethos of the rules and moved towards a more restrictive ethos,” which is thought 
unfortunate because “the application of plausibility pleading is likely to stymie 
many valid claims in addition to the groundless claims that will not survive”). 
But cf. DAVID F. HERR, ROGER S. HAYDOCK, & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF LITIGATION PRACTICE § 8.2 (2012) (noting that because “astute 
practitioners” have for years pleaded complaints with more than just their bare 
bones, “for most claims Twombly/Iqbal does not effect a serious or substantial 
change in pleading practice”). 
 10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)–(c) (outlining the requirements for admissions, 
denials, and affirmative defenses). 
 11. See, e.g., Godson v. Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C., 285 F.R.D. 255, 
258 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (using the phrase “what’s good for the goose is good for the 
gander”); Bank of Beaver City v. Southwest Feeders LLC, No. 4:10CV3209, 2011 
WL 4632887, at *7 (D. Neb. Oct. 4, 2011) (same); Lopez v. Asmar’s 
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This question has not been squarely addressed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Twombly,12 Iqbal,13 or any subsequent Court 
opinion. Nor has it yet been directly confronted by any U.S. court 
of appeals. Rather, this interpretative job has remained, to date, 
only the labor of the federal district courts, and they have written 
on the question aplenty. Their work is an intriguing story, 
complete with a curious minority-to-majority trending-line twist 
at the end. But their work is also a tale of disuniformity. And in 
that lack of uniformity, much mischief lurks.  
Part II of this Article illustrates the incoherence of the 
national courts on the issue of Twiqbal’s applicability to the 
pleading of affirmative defenses, and explains why this 
incoherence poses worrisome risks in federal civil litigation.14 
Part III selects an exemplar case decision as a vehicle for 
examining this issue. That case, Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp.,15 
                                                                                                     
Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 2011 WL 98573, at *1 (E.D. 
Va. Jan. 10, 2011) (same); Racick v. Dominion, 270 F.R.D. 228, 233 (E.D.N.C. 
2010); Kaufmann v. Prudential Ins. Co., Civ. No. 09–10239–RGS, 2009 WL 
2449872, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 6, 2009) (same). 
 12. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 13. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 14. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the pleading of 
both general and affirmative defenses, this Article explores the Twiqbal 
pleading question only as it respects the latter. General defense pleading is 
addressed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(1)(A), which provides that 
responding parties must “state in short and plain terms its defenses to each 
claim asserted against it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A). General defenses, however, 
are not especially prone to a Twiqbal pleading controversy for several reasons. 
First, general defenses confine the pleader to just three expressions—admitting 
the allegation, denying it, or announcing a lack of knowledge or information to 
either admit or deny. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(B), 8(b)(5) (setting forth general 
pleading requirements). That protocol does not lend itself to much of a factual 
pleading debate. Second, by explicit leave of the Rules, denials may be made 
generally (and, thus, conclusorily). See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(3) (allowing general 
denials). Third, post-Twombly authority confirms that such denials require no 
special pleader magic. See In re Sterten, 546 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 2008) (“No 
prescribed set of words need be employed in framing the general denial; any 
statement making it clear that the defendant intends to put in issue all of the 
averments in the opposing party’s pleading is sufficient.” (quoting 5 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1265, 
546–47 (3d ed. 2004)). In light of this explicit tolerance for conclusory, 
nonfactual defensive pleading, the inapplicability of Twiqbal to general defenses 
seems incontestable.  
 15. No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). 
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tackled the question in the context of a misappropriated likeness 
controversy filed by a professional football player against the 
maker of Alka-Seltzer. The opinion’s result and reasoning aligns 
with the growing majority of courts that have considered the 
issue, and offers a worthy guide for considering the issue in an 
actual litigation context. Part IV surveys the various opinions of 
the federal judiciary on the question, describing their respective 
approaches and the principal analyses that lead them to their 
conclusions. Part V examines the three litigation options 
available to those who must plead affirmative defenses, and 
concludes that none is safe, reliable, or certain.  
II. The Challenge of the National Incoherence on Twiqbal’s 
Applicability to Affirmative Defenses 
Few examples crystallize the incoherence of the nation’s 
treatment of Twiqbal and affirmative defenses quite as well as 
the remarkable tale of J & J Sports Productions, Inc. (J & J). This 
company hails from Campbell, California (about an hour south of 
San Francisco) and is in the business of sublicensing closed-
circuit television exhibitions of boxing telecasts.16 Apparently, J & 
J acquires exclusive nationwide commercial distribution rights 
for certain boxing matches and then sublicenses with various 
commercial establishments (including restaurants and bars) for 
the public exhibition of the match telecasts.17  Over the course of 
one seventeen-month period (July 2008–December 2009), J & J 
controlled the distribution rights for four such closed-circuit 
telecasted matches: “‘The Battle’: Miguel Cotto v. Antonio 
                                                                                                     
 16. See About Us, J & J SPORTS PRODS., INC., http://www.boxingseries.com/ 
about_us.php#1 (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (noting that the company has 
acquired rights to boxing broadcasts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 17. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Vargas, No. CV 11–2229–PHX–JAT, 
2012 WL 2919681, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2012) (noting these rights); J & J 
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Munoz, No. 1:10–cv–1563–WTL–TAB, 2011 WL 2881285, 
at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 15, 2011) (same); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Franco, No. 
CV F 10–1704 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 794826, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011) 
(same). 
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Margarito” (July 26, 2008);18 “‘The Dream Match’: Oscar De La 
Hoya v. Manny Pacquiao” (December 8, 2008);19 “‘Number One’: 
The Floyd Mayweather, Jr. v. Juan Manuel Marquez 
Championship Fight Program” (September 19, 2009);20 and 
“‘Firepower’: Manny Pacquiao v. Miguel Cotto” (November 14, 
2009).21  
Soon after these telecasts, J & J filed ten federal lawsuits in, 
respectively, the District of Arizona, the Eastern, Northern, and 
Southern Districts of California, and the Southern District of 
Indiana.22 The accusations in all ten lawsuits were essentially the 
same—J & J accused various restaurants, bars, and other 
business establishments with unlawfully intercepting the four 
boxing telecasts.23 Federal law proscribes such interceptions, and 
provides those injured with a right to recover compensatory and 
enhanced damages, court costs, and attorney’s fees.24 The 
                                                                                                     
 18. “The Battle” Litigation: J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Khachatrian, No. 
CV–10–1567–GMS–PHX,  2011 WL 720049 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2011). 
 19. “The Dream Match” Litigations: J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Luhn, No. 
2:10–CV–03229 JAM–CKD, 2011 WL 5040709 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011); Munoz, 
2011 WL 2881285; J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Scace, No. 10cv2496–WQH–CAB, 
2011 WL 2132723 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2011). 
20. “Number One” Litigations: J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Gidha, No. CIV 
S–10–2509 KJM–KJN, 
2012 WL 537494 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2012); Franco, 2011 WL 794826; J & J 
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Coyne, No. C 10–04206 CRB, 2011 WL 227670 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 24, 2011); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Montanez, No. 1:10–cv–01693–AWI–
SKO, 2010 WL 5279907 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010). 
 21. “Firepower” Litigations: Vargas, 2012 WL 2919681; J & J Sports Prods., 
Inc. v. Mendoza-Govan, No. C 10–05123 WHA, 2011 WL 1544886 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 25, 2011). 
 22. See supra notes 17–21 (outlining the J & J lawsuits). 
 23. Supra notes 17–21. In one of J & J’s other federal suits, the trial judge 
catalogued the various ways in which such unlawful interceptions might take 
place: (1) use of a device that “descrambles the reception of a pay-per-view 
broadcast when installed on a cable TV line;” (2) use of a card that “descrambles 
the reception of a pay-per-view broadcast when installed on a DSS satellite;” 
(3) use of a misrepresented purchase by which a commercial establishment 
underpays for the programming by declaring itself to qualify for a residential 
rate; (4) use of a cable splice or cable drop; and (5) acquiring “other illegal 
unencryption devices” or “illegal satellite authorization codes.” J & J Sports 
Prods., Inc. v. Patton, Civ. No. 10–40241–FDS, 2011 WL 5075828, at *4 n.3 (D. 
Mass. Oct. 25, 2011). 
 24. See 47 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (describing the penalties for “[u]nauthorized 
 
1580 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1573 (2013) 
defendants in each case filed answers to the complaints, 
including affirmative defenses.25 In response, J & J filed motions 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike each 
affirmative defense as insufficient, contending (among other 
things) that the pleaded defenses failed to meet the “plausibility” 
standard established by Twiqbal.26  
In the two Arizona opinions, two different district judges 
refused J & J’s request to apply Twiqbal, reasoning that, absent 
instructions otherwise from the Supreme Court or the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Twiqbal standard does not 
apply to affirmative defenses—the Spartan nature of defendants’ 
pleading notwithstanding.27 All the defenses survived. 
In two of the California cases, a district judge from the 
Northern District and a district judge from the Eastern District 
granted J & J’s request to apply Twiqbal, reasoning that 
affirmative defenses are indeed governed by the “plausibility” 
pleading standard.28 Both courts struck all of the respective 
defendants’ affirmative defenses (twenty-one defenses stricken in 
the Northern District case, twenty-nine defenses stricken in the 
Eastern District case), ruling that, as pleaded, the affirmative 
                                                                                                     
reception of cable service”). 
 25. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Vargas, No. CV 11–2229–PHX–JAT, 2012 
WL 2919681, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2012)”); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Munoz, 
No. 1:10–cv–1563–WTL–TAB, 2011 WL 2881285, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 15, 2011);  
J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Franco, No. CV F 10–1704 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 
794826, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Khachatrian, 
No. CV–10–1567–GMS–PHX, 2011 WL 720049 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2011). 
 26. Vargas, 2012 WL 2919681, at *2 n.1”); Munoz, 2011 WL 2881285, at *1; 
Franco, 2011 WL 794826, at *2; Khachatrian, 2011 WL 720049, at *1 n.1. See 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient 
defense . . . .”). 
 27. See Vargas, 2012 WL 2919681, at *2 n.1 (Teiborg, J.) (“[T]he Court is 
hesitant to apply the Twombly standard to test the sufficiency of Defendant’s 
pleading of his affirmative defenses.”); Khachatrian, 2011 WL 720049, at *1 n.1 
(Snow, J.) (“Plaintiff’s argument that the Court should apply the Twombly 
standard to Defendants’ affirmative defense is misplaced.”). 
 28. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Mendoza-Govan, No. C 10–05123 WHA, 
2011 WL 1544886 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2011) (Alsup, J.) (“Twombly’s 
heightened pleading standard applies to affirmative defenses . . . .”); Franco, 
2011 WL 794826, at *2  (O’Neill, J.) (applying the plausibility standard to 
affirmative defenses). 
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defenses were “boilerplate” that lacked “supporting facts.”29 As 
one of the judges admonished, such a pleading approach fell well 
short of the standard Twiqbal imposed: “To state an affirmative 
defense sufficiently, a defendant must plead ‘enough facts to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”30 Consequently, the 
affirmative defenses, as austerely pleaded, “amount to ‘blanket 
assertions’ of legal theories” that “fail to provide [J & J] with fair 
notice as to the facts upon which the defenses are asserted.”31  
In the Indiana opinion, the district judge rejected J & J’s 
request to apply Twiqbal, but held that affirmative defenses may 
be stricken nonetheless if they are “insufficient on the face of the 
pleadings.”32 The court then explained that some of the sparsely 
pleaded affirmative defenses were sufficient and some were not, 
and entered a ruling granting in part and denying in part the 
motion to strike.33  
In the five remaining cases, all from California districts, five 
different district judges ruled that they did not have to decide 
whether Twiqbal applied to affirmative defenses or not. Instead, 
by applying an arguably more forgiving “fair notice” standard, 
two of the judges (one from the Eastern District and one from the 
Southern District) found that cursory allegations imparted proper 
notice to the plaintiff,34 although three other, different judges 
(two from the Eastern District and one from the Northern 
District) found that cursory allegations did not give proper notice 
to the plaintiff.35 
                                                                                                     
 29. See Mendoza-Govan, 2011 WL 1544886, at *1–8 (“[D]efendant does not 
supply any supporting facts . . . .”); Franco, 2011 WL 794826, at *2–4 (“[A] 
boilerplate defense . . . [not] supported by facts.”). 
 30. Franco, 2011 WL 794826, at *2 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554). 
 31. Id.  
 32. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Munoz, No. 1:10–cv–1563–WTL–TAB, 2011 
WL 2881285, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. July 15, 2011) (Lawrence, J.). 
 33. See id. (allowing some affirmative defenses but striking others). 
 34. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Luhn, No. 2:10–CV–03229 JAM–CKD, 
2011 WL 5040709, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011) (Hayes, J.) (finding that 
plaintiff had sufficient notice of defendant’s defenses); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. 
v. Scace, No. 10cv2496–WQH–CAB, 2011 WL 2132723, at *2–4 (S.D. Cal. May 
27, 2011) (Mendez, J.) (same). 
35. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Gidha, No. CIV S–10–2509 KJM–KJN, 
2012 WL 537494, at *2–5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2012) (Mueller, J.) (“This court also 
 
1582 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1573 (2013) 
One litigant. Ten written opinions, by ten different federal 
judges sitting in three different states. The same essential motion 
filed ten times under the identical Federal Rule. Five different 
outcomes, supported by five differing views of Twiqbal’s 
applicability to affirmative defenses. If you were J & J Sports 
Productions, Inc., or its counsel, it’d probably be tough to know 
whether you were telecasting boxing matches, or enduring one. 
The danger with this national incoherence is made clear by 
simply considering the nature of affirmative defenses. 
Not all defenses are affirmative ones, but the list of 
affirmative defenses testifies to their potentially case-dispositive 
importance. They include: assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, estoppel, fraud, laches, release, res judicata, statute 
of frauds, statute of limitations, and waiver.36 These are not 
inconsequential legal arguments; if any of these defenses exist, 
they could terminate portions (or the entirety) of a claimant’s 
lawsuit.37 They may well prove to be, therefore, critical legal 
positions in a litigation. 
Yet, affirmative defenses are vulnerable to loss at the 
pleading stage. Indeed, even delaying the assertion of an 
affirmative defense carries formidable risks. The Federal Rules 
obligate defending parties to “affirmatively” assert such defenses 
in their responsive pleadings.38 Unasserted affirmative defenses 
                                                                                                     
declines to reach the issue of whether the heightened pleading standard applies 
to defendants’ answer because, as set forth below, the challenged affirmative 
defenses do not meet the lower pleading standard . . . .”); J & J Sports Prods., 
Inc. v. Coyne, No. C 10–04206 CRB, 2011 WL 227670, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
24, 2011) (Breyer, J.) (same); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Montanez, No. 1:10–
cv–01693–AWI–SKO, 2010 WL 5279907, at *2–5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010) 
(Oberto, Mag.) (same). 
 36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (listing potential affirmative defenses). And 
this list is unquestionably non-exhaustive. See id. (“In responding to a pleading, 
a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including 
[listing of defenses].”) (emphasis added). See also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 
212 (2007) (confirming that “Rule 8(c) identifies a nonexhaustive list of 
affirmative defenses that must be pleaded in response”). 
 37. See, e.g., Oden v. Oktibbeha Cnty., 246 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that affirmative defenses “will defeat an otherwise legitimate claim for 
relief” (citations omitted)). 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (2008) 
(“Ordinarily, it is incumbent on the defendant to plead and prove . . . [an 
affirmative] defense.”); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 
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may be deemed waived and, therefore, lost to the defending 
litigant forever.39 Consequently, given their potentially pivotal 
significance in litigation, as well as the risk posed by omitting 
them, it has long been among  the “best practices” of prudent 
defending parties to include any affirmative defense that might 
possibly prove to be germane (regardless of whether the known 
facts can snugly support such assertions).40 Whatever Twiqbal 
may be understood to mean, it probably does not tolerate that 
longstanding approach to affirmative defense pleading. 
An attack on a pleaded affirmative defense is resolved under 
Rule 12(f)—precisely where this Twiqbal uncertainty now lies. 
Although settled legal principles guide the resolution of Rule 12(f) 
motions,41 the decision to grant or deny such attacks is considered 
to be committed to the trial judge’s sound discretion.42 That 
discretion, furthermore, is considered “liberal” in the context of 
Rule 12(f).43 Consequently, the authority this standard invests in 
the trial judge is vast, bounded only by abject arbitrariness or 
legal error. As one court explained the abuse of discretion 
                                                                                                     
130, 133 (2008) (“[T]he law typically treats a limitations defense as an 
affirmative defense that the defendant must raise at the pleadings stage and 
that is subject to rules of forfeiture and waiver.”). 
 39. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (citing Rule 8(c) for 
the proposition that “[o]rdinarily in civil litigation, a statutory time limitation is 
forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in an amendment thereto”); 
Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 58 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (“The law is clear that if an affirmative defense is not pleaded 
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)’s requirements, it is waived.”). 
 40. See Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 
2011 WL 98573, at *2 n.5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011) (“While counsel often plead 
vast numbers of affirmative defenses without being sure whether the facts will 
ultimately support the defenses, such pleading is done precisely so that the 
defenses will be preserved should discovery or further proceedings reveal factual 
support.” (quoting Wanamaker v. Albrecht, No. 95-8061, 1996 WL 582738, at *5 
(10th Cir. Oct. 11,1996))). 
 41. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales 
underpinning Rule 12(f) decisions). 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379–80 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(applying abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a motion to strike); Siskiyou 
Reg’l Educ. Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F.3d 545, 559 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(same); Delta Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Const., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 
1141–42 (7th Cir. 2009) (same). 
 43. See BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 
2007) (“Judges enjoy liberal discretion to strike pleadings under Rule 12(f).”). 
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standard, it is “abused only where no reasonable man would take 
the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ 
as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it 
cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.”44  
Moreover, once exercised, this immense discretionary 
authority is further insulated from searching appellate review by 
two other principles. First, the harmless error rule establishes 
that even acknowledged judicial mistakes under Rule 12(f) will 
usually be immune from reversal absent proof of prejudice to the 
appealing party.45 Second, that opportunity for appellate review 
(modest as it may be) will almost certainly have to await the 
entry of a case-concluding final order; interlocutory appeals from 
a Rule 12(f) strike are extraordinarily unlikely.46 This alone may 
end the chance for review. Given that so tiny a portion of federal 
civil litigation is actually resolved by trial and the involuntary 
entry of an appealable final order,47 the prospects for even the 
opportunity for a meaningful appellate review will likely be quite 
dim for all but a small portion of challenged Rule 12(f) rulings.  
At bottom, then, the specter now confronting federal civil 
defendants is this: there is national confusion about how to 
                                                                                                     
 44. Delno v. Mkt. St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942); see also 
Bethel v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 371 Fed. Appx. 57, 61 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“Under this standard, we do not disturb the district court’s decision as long as 
it is within a range of reasonable choices and is not influenced by any mistake of 
law.”); Seay v. TVA, 339 F.3d 454, 480 (6th Cir. 2003) (“We review the decision 
to grant or deny a motion to strike for an abuse of discretion, and decisions that 
are reasonable, that is, not arbitrary, will not be overturned.” (citation omitted)).  
 45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (installing harmless error standard); Toth v. 
Corning Glass Works, 411 F.2d 912, 914 (6th Cir. 1969) (applying harmless 
error principles to alleged error in failing to strike a claim). 
 46. See, e.g., Houston Cnty. Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Texas, 
Inc., 481 F.3d 265, 268 (5th Cir. 2007) (describing the collateral order rule as a 
“narrow doctrine” permitting review of a “small category of decisions” that are 
“conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that 
are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the 
underlying action”); Camacho v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 369 F.3d 570, 573 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (commenting that immediate appeals from interlocutory orders under 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) are “hen’s-teeth rare”).  
 47. See Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The Vanishing Trial, 
LITIGATION, Winter 2004, at 3, 4, http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publishing/litigation_journal/04winter_openingstatement.authcheckdam.p
df (discussing data finding that only 1.8% of civil cases were disposed of by trial). 
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properly plead affirmative defenses, notwithstanding that those 
defenses may well prove to be case-dispositive in nature, 
notwithstanding that they can be deemed waived by being 
belatedly (or improperly) asserted, and notwithstanding that the 
prospects are indescribably remote for an effective post-trial 
appellate review from an adverse Rule 12(f) ruling that is 
provably not harmless and so far outside the enormously 
sweeping discretionary authority imparted to the district court as 
to be reversible. The specter only darkens when one considers the 
risk (small though it may be) that a motion to strike will be 
granted by the trial judge with prejudice and therefore without 
hope of any rescue through repleading.48 
That federal civil litigation now finds itself in so untenable a 
position is, perhaps, not surprising as the courts continue to work 
through the meaning and implications of Twiqbal. However, the 
fact that a single litigant—J & J Sports Productions, Inc.—could 
encounter the full range of the disparate impact of this national 
uncertainty ought to be a clarion call for resolution. 
III. A Litigation Exemplar: Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp. 
Oftentimes, assessments of the proper functioning of federal 
civil practice are gauged on the theoretical plane, where 
competing policy and practical concerns are examined in their 
predictive states, largely divorced from “boots-on-the-ground” 
applied realities. The proper role for Twiqbal in testing the 
adequacy of federal defenses (and, particularly, affirmative 
defenses) calls for a more applied approach. For that exercise, 
this article turns to Weddle v. Bayer AG Corporation. 
The Weddle decision offers a helpful platform to guide this 
exploration for several reasons. First, the result it reaches and 
the reasoning it applies aligns with the emerging national 
majority on this Twiqbal question.49 Second, the case comes from 
                                                                                                     
 48. See, e.g., Herrera v. Utilimap Corp., Civ. No. H–11–3851, 2012 WL 
3527065, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2012) (denying defendant’s request to replead 
affirmative defenses that the court just struck, ruling that the record did not 
reveal the good cause necessary to permit such an amendment). 
 49. See infra Part IV (surveying judicial opinions on the issue). 
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a federal judicial region (the U.S. Ninth Judicial Circuit) that has 
been especially active (and internally divided) in considering this 
question, allowing for a localized assessment of the issue in both 
a predecision and postdecision setting. Third, the opinion is one of 
a small handful of cases decided in the context of a single 
industry (namely, pharmaceutical and medical device litigation) 
and offers the opportunity to view this issue within a topical 
litigation environment. Fourth, the case facts make for a 
fascinating read.  
Although this exemplar case examines this Twiqbal issue in 
the context of a defendant’s affirmative defenses, this is not, in 
truth, a “defendant” problem. It is, rather, a “defending party” 
problem and will confront plaintiffs facing counterclaims and 
third parties facing impleader complaints just as certainly as it 
confronts original defendants.50 In Weddle, the problem 
confronted two defendants sued by a star athlete. 
A. Mr. Weddle’s Case and Its Pleadings 
Plaintiff Eric S. Weddle plays professional football at the 
position of free safety for the National Football League’s San 
Diego Chargers.51 He has enjoyed an impressive football career. 
He was drafted by the Chargers in 2007 out of the University of 
Utah, where his collegiate exploits hearken back to a bygone era 
in big-time college football where players routinely pounded out 
their team’s defense and, on change of possession, stayed on the 
field to run the offense.52 In one particular game during Weddle’s 
senior year at Utah (a 17–14 victory in November 2006 over Air 
Force), he was in the game for a numbing 90 plays: he made 8 
solo tackles as a defensive back, scored twice as a running back, 
returned a punt, and held the ball for the team’s placekicker for 
                                                                                                     
 50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a) (confirming that answers are expected not just 
to complaints but to counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-party complaints). 
 51. Player Bio—Eric Weddle, CHARGERS.COM, http://www.chargers.com/ 
team/roster/eric-weddle/f387ca47-e2bc-4716-9701-45026c431914/ (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 52. See id. (noting Weddle’s college awards, which include both offensive 
and defensive recognitions).  
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the winning field goal in overtime.53 (In other college games, he’d 
shown still more versatility by being a passer, throwing at least 
once for a touchdown.)54 “The only people who spend more time 
on the field than Weddle each Saturday,” gushed one sports 
columnist, “are referees.”55 
It was hardly surprising that, once in the NFL, Weddle’s 
success continued. His rookie year, he helped ensure a Chargers’ 
playoff victory over the Indianapolis Colts by intercepting Peyton 
Manning on the goal line.56 He has since been voted to the Pro 
Bowl once, named a three-time All-Pro, voted the team’s 
defensive player-of-the-year in 2011, and voted the team’s most-
valuable-player in 2012.57 Off the field, Weddle’s public 
recognition has led him to become a spokesperson for the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.58 
It was Weddle’s prominence as a football player and public 
figure that triggered the lawsuit that became Weddle v. Bayer AG 
Corp. In August 2009, an odd advertising campaign was launched 
to jointly promote a new sports book and antacid tablets.59 For 
                                                                                                     
 53. Doug Robinson, Why Not Give Heisman to Utah’s Eric Weddle?, 
DESERET NEWS (Nov. 27, 2006), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/ 
650210369/Why-not-give-Heisman-to-Utahs-Eric-Weddle.html; Utah 17, Air 
Force 14, SR/COLLEGE FOOTBALL (Nov. 18, 2006), http://www.sports-
reference.com/cfb/boxscores/2006-11-18-air-force.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Player Bio—Eric Weddle, 
supra note 51.  
 54. Robinson, supra note 53. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Player Bio—Eric Weddle, supra note 51.  
 57. Weddle Voted Chargers Most Valuable Player, CHARGERS.COM (Dec. 28, 
2012), http://www.chargers.com/news/press-releases/2-1/Weddle-Voted-Charg 
ers-Most-Valuable-Player/b29a4203-3409-4352-bb91-ff223d682774 (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 58. Trent Toone, Chargers’ Eric Weddle Finds His Joy in the LDS Church, 
DESERET NEWS (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/ 
705377418/Chargers-Eric-Weddle-finds-his-joy-in-the-LDS-Church.html?pg=all. 
 59. Neither the pleadings in the Weddle case nor the court’s Twiqbal 
opinion offer any further insights into this curious co-promotion. Perhaps 
antacid tablets were considered a natural product-partner for football handbook 
users because not all members of the sport’s fandom limit their enjoyment to 
“entertainment-only.” Such a surmise would likely have only added to Weddle’s 
feelings of affront, as a member of his Church. See Gospel Topics: Gambling, 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, http://www. 
lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jsp?locale=0&sourceId=c9bb2f2324d98010VgnVCM100000
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the co-promotion, national sports publisher Athlon Sports 
collaborated with Bayer USA, a subsidiary of Bayer AG 
Corporation, to jointly promote the 2009 Football Handbook 
(published by Athlon) and Alka-Seltzer antacid tablets 
(manufactured by Bayer).60 In conjunction with this joint 
promotion, national advertising was launched, including a special 
promotional packaging for Alka-Seltzer tablets to be sold in Wal-
Mart, Walgreens, CVS, and other pharmacies throughout the 
country.61 A featured image for both the advertising campaign 
and the Alka-Seltzer packaging was a photograph of a running 
football player carrying a ball. Evidently, the photo the campaign 
chose was an often-used one of Weddle, taken during his 2006 
college football season at Utah.62 Neither Weddle’s name nor the 
Utah school or team names appear on the athlete’s jersey or 
elsewhere in the photo. But it seems that these omissions were 
manufactured artificially by “photoshopping” the existing image 
to obscure team logos and to darken the running player’s 
helmeted face.63 Nonetheless, Weddle contended that, even 
“photoshopped,” the image was still “clearly” one of him because 
the base photo was unquestionably one that had been taken of his 
play (and a widely seen one at that), and because the jersey’s 
number (#32) was the number Weddle wore in college (and, also, 
later as a pro).64 
                                                                                                     
4d82620a____&vgnextoid=bbd508f54922d010VgnVCM1000004d82620aRCRD 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (“The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is 
opposed to gambling, including lotteries sponsored by governments. Church 
leaders have encouraged Church members to join with others in opposing the 
legalization and government sponsorship of any form of gambling.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 60. Complaint ¶ 20, Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 
2012 WL 1019824 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). 
 61. Id. ¶ 24. 
 62. See id. ¶ 22 (“[Defendants] selected a photo from an online photo 
database of Weddle . . . .”). 
 63. Chargers’ Weddle Accuses Bayer, Athlon of Unauthorized Use of His 
Image, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www. 
sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2011/04/22/Marketing-and-Sponsorship/Wed 
dle.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 64. Complaint ¶¶ 14 & 22.  
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Weddle considered this promotional use of his (albeit 
“photoshopped”) photograph to be a misappropriation of his 
image and likeness, as well as a deception suggesting—
inaccurately—that he was associated with or had otherwise 
endorsed the co-promoted products.65 Weddle’s attorney wrote to 
Athlon Sports insisting they cease-and-desist from further use of 
the photograph and, when they seemingly failed to do so (or to do 
so promptly or sufficiently), Weddle filed his lawsuit in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of California (San 
Diego).66 The lawsuit contained eight claims, alleging violations of 
the federal and California statutory image misappropriation 
laws, the Lanham Act, the California False or Misleading 
Advertising Act, the California Preservation and Regulation of 
Competition Act, as well as common law misappropriation, 
conspiracy to misappropriate, and unauthorized commercial use 
of likeness.67 Weddle sought actual damages in the amount of a 
reasonable royalty fee, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.68 
In their original answer, Athlon Sports and Bayer USA 
replied with specific paragraphed denials to Weddle’s allegations, 
and then asserted fifteen affirmative defenses.69 Weddle 
responded by moving to strike all of the affirmative defenses. He 
argued that the defenses “had not complied with Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a short and plain statement 
of the defense asserted” and were instead “merely . . . bare bone 
conclusory allegations” that “fail to put Plaintiff on fair notice of 
the nature of the defense.”70 Weddle’s motion was soon mooted, 
                                                                                                     
 65. Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 62, & 70.  
 66. Id. ¶¶ 23 (and Exhibit “C”) & 42. 
 67. Id. ¶¶ 25–84. 
 68. Id. ¶ 15. 
 69. These originally pleaded affirmative defenses were (1) failure to state a 
claim; (2) lack of standing; (3) innocent infringer/lack of willfulness; (4) no jury 
for equitable issues; (5) failure to mitigate; (6) statute of limitations; (7) laches; 
(8) First Amendment; (9) newsworthiness; (10) request to strike punitive 
damages; (11) NCAA standing; (12) plaintiff not identifiable; (13) waiver; 
(14) estoppel; and (15) consent. Answer to Complaint ¶¶ 7–10, Weddle v. Bayer 
AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).  
 70. Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824, 
at *3 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012)  (quoting Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, Weddle 
v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824, (S.D. Cal. Mar. 
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however, when he filed an amended complaint.71 This, in turn, 
prompted the two defendants to file a new answer, which again 
included specific paragraphed denials, but this time asserted only 
five affirmative defenses: (1) lack of standing; (2) innocent 
infringer/lack of willfulness; (3) First Amendment; 
(4) newsworthiness; and (5) request to strike punitive damages.72 
The last three of these defenses were pleaded exactly as they had 
been in the original answer. The first two defenses, however, were 
factually enhanced. As originally pleaded, the lack of standing 
defense had read simply: 
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert some or all of his claims for 
relief.73 
As reconfigured for the new answer, the defendants elaborated:  
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert some or all of his claims for 
relief because, among other things, on information and belief 
and subject to further discovery, Defendants contend that 
Plaintiff assigned to the University of Utah and/or the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) any and all rights to 
exploit his name, image, likeness and other indicia of his 
identity as he appeared as a player for the University of Utah.74 
Similarly, the innocent infringer defense to the original complaint 
had read: 
To the extent that Defendants infringed Plaintiff’s trademark 
rights, which Defendants deny, such infringement was innocent 
and not willful.75 
In the new answer to the amended complaint, defendants 
expanded: 
                                                                                                     
26, 2012)).  
 71. The revised pleading was filed pursuant to an unusual “joint motion” 
for leave to file an amended complaint. Weddle, 2012 WL 1019824, at *1. 
Consequently, the court had no cause to rule upon the first motion to strike. 
 72. Answer to Amended Complaint ¶¶ 7–9, Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 
11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).  
 73. Answer to Complaint at 7, Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 
JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). 
 74. Answer to Amended Complaint, supra note 72, at 7.  
 75. Answer to Complaint, supra note 73, at 7.  
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To the extent that Defendants infringed Plaintiff’s trademark 
or other rights, which Defendants specifically deny, 
Defendants did not know or believe at the time the materials 
at issue in the First Amended Complaint were created and 
distributed that such materials contained or used or could be 
recognized as using an image and/or trademark of Plaintiff 
and therefore any alleged infringement of Plaintiff’s 
trademark or other rights was innocent and not willful.76 
Weddle then moved the district judge to strike the 
defendants’ five affirmative defenses or, in the alternative, to 
compel the defendants to submit a more definite statement.77  
B. The Weddle Court’s Ruling 
As he framed it, Weddle’s challenge to the five affirmative 
defenses Athlon Sports and Bayer USA had pleaded in their new 
answer obligated the trial court to make three rulings. First, as a 
threshold matter, the court had to determine the federal pleading 
standard by which the defendants’ affirmative defenses would be 
measured. Second, the court had to apply those standards to 
resolve Weddle’s motion to strike the defenses. Third, if the 
defenses were not stricken, the court had to determine whether to 
order defendants to supply a more specific statement of their 
defenses. The judge who was called upon to make these 
determinations was the Honorable Janis Lynn Sammartino of the 
San Diego federal bench.78  
The first two rulings would hinge on Weddle’s request for 
relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), motions to 
                                                                                                     
 76. Answer to Amended Complaint, supra note 72, at 7.  
 77. Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824, 
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). 
 78. Judge Sammartino was nominated to the bench by President George W. 
Bush and received her commission in 2007. She was born in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, received her A.B. from Occidental College and her J.D. from 
Notre Dame. She served as a San Diego deputy city attorney for eighteen years, 
followed by terms on the San Diego municipal and superior courts. See 
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Sammartino, Janis Lynn, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (follow “s” hyperlink; then 
click “Sammartino”) (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (providing biography) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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strike. The third would turn on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(e), motions for more specific statements. Neither Rule is 
especially hospitable for litigants. Extensive case precedent 
confirms that both motions are viewed by courts with “disfavor” 
and are to be only sparingly granted.79 Judge Sammartino began 
her opinion by noting just that. “[M]otions to strike,” she wrote, 
“are generally regarded with disfavor because of the limited 
importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they are 
often used as a delaying tactic.”80 Consequently, unless the 
matter sought to be stricken could, without “any doubt,” have “no 
possible bearing on the subject of the litigation,” motions to strike 
should be refused.81 Likewise, she wrote, motions for more 
definite statements should only be entertained when the pleading 
under attack is “so indefinite” that a responding party would not 
“ascertain the nature of the claims being asserted and literally 
cannot frame a responsive pleading.”82 With those introductory 
principles behind her, Judge Sammartino turned to Weddle’s 
motions. 
First, the threshold issue of pleading standard had to be 
resolved. This compelled the court to tackle the critical Twiqbal 
question.  
As all federal litigators can probably recite now from 
memory, the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2007 Twombly decision 
formally “retired” the oft-quoted mantra from Conley v. Gibson83 
                                                                                                     
 79. See, e.g., 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1380, at 394 (2004) (collecting cases and noting: 
“[b]oth because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because 
it often is sought by the movant simply as a dilatory or harassing 
tactic, numerous judicial decisions make clear that motions under Rule 12(f) are 
viewed with disfavor by the federal courts and are infrequently granted” 
(footnotes omitted)); id. § 1377, at 338–39 (collecting cases and noting “as a 
result of the generally disfavored status of these motions [for a more definite 
statement], the proportion of Rule 12(e) requests granted by the district courts 
appears to have remained quite low” (citations omitted)). 
 80. Weddle, 2012 WL 1019824, at *1 (quoting Neilson v. Union Bank of 
Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2003)). 
 81. Id. (quoting Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 
1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). 
 82. Id. (quoting Hubbs v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 
1262 (C.D. Cal. 2008)). 
 83. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).  
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that federal complaints should not be dismissed “unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”84 The 
Court forced Conley to pasture, it explained, because such a 
construction of the federal pleading rules could, if “read in 
isolation,” mean that “any statement revealing the theory of the 
claim will suffice unless its factual impossibility may be shown 
from the face of the pleadings.”85 This, the Court concluded, was 
an incorrect reading of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) 
and its admonition that pleading a federal claim requires “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.”86 Although that austere standard would not 
necessitate “detailed factual allegations,” more was expected than 
mere “labels and conclusions” and “formulaic recitation[s] of the 
elements of a cause of action.”87 Instead, as Rule 8(a)(2) 
commanded, to “show” the “grounds” for an “entitle[ment] to 
relief,” federal pleaders were obligated to supply “enough” factual 
allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,”88 
                                                                                                     
 84. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561–63 (2007) (“[Conley’s] 
‘no set of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away 
long enough . . . [A]fter puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous 
observation has earned its retirement.” (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46)). See 
generally STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM M. JANSSEN, JOHN B. CORR, FEDERAL 
CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK 333–36, 452–55 (2013) (discussing background and 
principles of Twombly and Iqbal). 
 85. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561.  
 86. Id. at 555 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. The requirements of a “showing” and an “entitle[ment] to relief” are 
both found in the text of Rule 8(a)(2) itself. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“A 
pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: . . . a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). The majority found the requirement of a “showing” 
corroborative of its conclusion that an adequate factual presentation from 
claimants is essential. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3  
Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion 
of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the 
complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the 
requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the 
claim, but also “grounds” on which the claim rests. 
The requirement of stating the “grounds” for a claim comes a bit more indirectly. 
The Rule drafters had expressly required a statement of “grounds” for invoking 
the court’s jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (“[A] short and plain 
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or, as the Court later casted it, the pleading must “possess 
enough heft”89 to “nudge[] . . . claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible.”90 This “plausibility” inquiry, explained 
the Court, “simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to prove the 
allegations.91 “[S]omething beyond . . . mere possibility” is 
necessary “lest a plaintiff with ‘a largely groundless claim’ be 
allowed to ‘take up the time of a number of other people, with the 
right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the 
settlement value.’”92  
Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court reaffirmed 
the “plausibility” test for federal claims, verifying that the 
Twombly ruling “expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil 
actions,’” and rejecting—as “not supported by Twombly and . . . 
incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”—the 
intimation that the ruling ought not apply to all federal 
complaints.93 The Court in Iqbal further explained how the 
appropriate “plausibility” inquiry progresses linearly through two 
steps: first, the court must set aside allegations that are “nothing 
more than conclusions,” because, as to those, the court will not 
defer to their truth; second, the court must focus on the “well-
pleaded” factual allegations, and, as to those, assume their truth 
and, then, assess whether they (and only they) plausibly give rise 
to an entitlement to relief.94 This “plausibility” inquiry, the Court 
concluded, is to be “a context-specific task that requires the 
                                                                                                     
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . .”). But, as the quotation 
above confirms, that term is absent from the later obligation of pleading an 
entitlement to relief. Nevertheless, the obligation was pronounced summarily by 
the Court in Conley v. Gibson. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (“[A]ll the Rules 
require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant 
fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 
(emphasis added)). The Conley Court’s source for this “grounds” obligation is not 
expressly identified in that opinion.  
 89. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. 
 90. Id. at 570. 
 91. Id. at 556. 
 92. Id. at 557–58 (quoting Dura Pharmas., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 
347 (2005)) (citations omitted).  
 93. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). 
 94. Id. at 679. 
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reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 
sense.”95 
What neither Twombly nor Iqbal addressed, however, was 
whether this “plausibility” standard, formulated for claims (that, 
under Rule 8(a)(2), must be “show[n]” to have an “entitlement to 
relief”96) also applies to general and affirmative defenses. Of 
course, that comes as no particular surprise. The Court in both 
Twombly and Iqbal was testing the allegations of complaints 
against motions to dismiss; there was no occasion to consider, or 
cause to rule upon, the pleading standard governing answers.  
Had the Court so ventured, however, it likely would have 
begun with the text of the implicated Rules.97 The Rules 
governing general and affirmative defenses are expressed 
differently than the standard for claims. Rule 8(b)(1)(A) requires 
of responding parties that they must “state in short and plain 
terms [their] defenses to each claim asserted against [them].”98 
Rule 8(c)(1) requires further that responding parties “must 
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”99 
Notably, neither provision contains any explicit analogue to Rule 
8(a)(2)’s command for a “showing” of an “entitlement to relief,”100 
nor the Conley Court’s command for an exposition of “grounds.”101 
In her research, Judge Sammartino in Weddle found no U.S. 
court of appeals decision ruling squarely on this question of 
whether Twiqbal applied to defenses.102 She also determined that 
                                                                                                     
 95. Id.  
 96. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  
 97. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) 
(“We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning, and 
generally with them as with a statute, ‘[w]hen we find the terms . . . 
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.’” (citations omitted)). 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A). 
 99. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
 100. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 101. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (requiring a statement of 
the grounds of plaintiff’s claim). 
 102. See Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 
1019824, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (noting a lack of appellate rulings on 
the issue). That remains true as this Article goes to press. None of the U.S. 
courts of appeals has expressly ruled whether Twiqbal should, or should not, 
apply to the pleading of affirmative defenses.  See, e.g., Herrera v. Churchill 
McGee, LLC, 680 F.3d 539, 547 n.6 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We . . . have no occasion to 
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the district courts within the Ninth Circuit “have gone both 
ways.”103 (Interestingly, in the string-citation she offered to 
illustrate this division, Judge Sammartino tended towards 
modeling the national trend on the issue—of the five cases she 
cited, four rejected Twiqbal’s application to defenses and the one 
case that embraced the notion was also the earliest one in time, 
decided in 2007, on the heels of the Twombly opinion.)104 After 
surveying this split and considering the competing arguments, 
she ruled that “Twombly’s heightened pleading standard does not 
apply to Defendants’ defenses.”105 Instead, citing what she found 
to be controlling local circuit precedent on the issue, Judge 
Sammartino held that “[t]he key to determining the sufficiency of 
pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair 
notice of the defense.”106 
Second, having settled on the governing legal standard for 
Weddle’s motion to strike, the court then proceeded to test the 
five challenged affirmative defenses. She ruled that none of the 
Athlon Sports/Bayer USA affirmative defenses ought to be 
stricken:  
First Affirmative Defense—Lack of Standing: Weddle had 
attacked this first defense as “bare bone conclusory 
allegations” that “fail[] to [give] Plaintiff fair notice of the 
nature of the defense.”107 Judge Sammartino, however, 
corrected the plaintiff: unlike the original answer (which had 
been pleaded in “bare bones” fashion), the answer to the 
amended complaint added enhancement details and was 
sufficient to impart fair notice of the defendants’ factual 
                                                                                                     
address, and express no view regarding, the impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), on 
affirmative defenses.”). 
 103. Id.  
 104. See id. at *2 (citing cases). In fact, this one outlier “Twiqbal-applies” 
case among Judge Sammartino’s five citations was decided on August 13, 
2007—less than 90 days after Twombly was released and in the veritable 
maelstrom that marked the early reaction to the new “plausibility” principle. 
See id. (noting Anticancer, Inc. v. Xenogen Corp., 248 F.R.D. 278, 282 (S.D. Cal. 
2007) as the one outlier case). 
 105. Id. at *3.  
 106. Id. (quoting Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 
1979) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957))).  
 107. Id. at *3 n.1. 
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argument, namely “that Plaintiff lacks standing because he 
has assigned his rights to the NCAA or the University of 
Utah.”108 
Second Affirmative Defense—Innocent Infringer: Weddle had 
attacked this second defense as legally insufficient because 
ignorance of the law is ordinarily no excuse for misconduct.109 
Again, the court corrected the plaintiff: defendants were not 
claiming ignorance of the law but rather seeking to negate an 
element of plaintiff’s case (namely, knowledge).110 The court 
agreed with Weddle that the averment was not a true 
“affirmative defense” because all it proposed to do was 
“negate[] an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.”111 
Even so, however, strikes are disfavored, and because Weddle 
could show no prejudice from allowing the allegation to 
remain, the motion to strike was denied.112 
Third and Fourth Affirmative Defenses—First Amendment & 
Newsworthiness: Weddle challenged these defenses as failing 
to supply him or the court with “notice of the specific legal 
basis and/or facts for avoiding liability for the claims alleged in 
the Complaint based upon the constitutional grounds asserted 
in such defense.”113 Although acknowledging the averments to 
be “somewhat sparse as to how the referenced constitutional 
provisions serve to protect Defendants from liability or how 
the newsworthiness of the publication bears on Defendants’ 
liability,” the court found that Weddle had received “notice of 
the defense asserted,” and that sufficed.114 
Fifth Affirmative Defense—Punitive Damages: Lastly, Weddle 
challenged the adequacy of defendants’ contentions that 
punitive damages could not be awarded because no facts 
supported such relief and because both the vagueness doctrine 
and the Constitution would forbid it.115 The court rejected this 
challenge as well, ruling that the averment was either a 
                                                                                                     
 108. Id. at *3. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at *4 (citation omitted). 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at *5. 
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nonprejudicially mislabeled general defense or adequate “fair 
notice of the defense asserted.”116 
Third and finally, Judge Sammartino turned to Weddle’s 
alternative request that defendants be ordered to file a more 
definite statement. Here, too, Weddle met no success. The court 
noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) permits such 
more definite statement requests only “of a pleading to which a 
responsive pleading is allowed.”117 Because plaintiffs are not 
generally “allowed” to file a responsive pleading to a defendant’s 
answer, and because Judge Sammartino had not granted Weddle 
special leave to so respond, the predicate for Rule 12(e) relief was 
absent.118 Weddle’s motion thus denied in its entirety, the case 
proceeded on.  
C. The Weddle Court’s Rationale 
As Judge Sammartino weighed her decision on whether to 
apply Twiqbal “plausibility” to affirmative defenses, she enjoyed 
the benefit of consulting a fruitful body of precedent within her 
judicial region, the Ninth Circuit. As of the date she ruled, at 
least fifteen of her trial-level circuit colleagues had written post-
Iqbal opinions on the issue and, though divided, a majority view 
was emerging. At least nine of those courts ruled that Twiqbal 
should not apply to affirmative defenses,119 at least five held that 
                                                                                                     
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e)). 
 118. Id. at *5. 
 119. Twiqbal Not Applied: Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., Nos. 3:11–cv–
00481–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00485–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00853–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–
cv–00854–RCJ–VPC, 2012 WL 607539 (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2012); Kohler v. Islands 
Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2012); Meas v. CVS Pharmacy, 
Inc., No. 11cv0823 JM(JMA), 2011 WL 2837432 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2011); J & J 
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Scace, No. 10cv2496–WQH–CAB, 2011 WL 2132723 (S.D. 
Cal. May 27, 2011); In re Washington Mut., Inc., Secs., Derivative & ERISA 
Litig., No. 08–md–1919 MJP, 2011 WL 1158387 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2011); J 
& J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Khachatrian, No. CV–10–1567–GMS–PHX, 2011 WL 
720049 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2011); Trustmark Ins. Co. v. C&K Mkt., Inc., No. CV 
10–465–MO, 2011 WL 587574 (D. Or. Feb. 10, 2011); Garber v. Mohammadi, 
No. CV 10–7144–DDP (RNB), 2011 WL 2076341 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011); 
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it should,120 and one touched on the issue without making a 
definitive ruling.121 This bounty of case law, along with the 
briefing of the litigants Weddle, Athlon Sports, and Bayer AG, 
ensured her ability to assess the issue comprehensively. 
In the end, the emerging Ninth Circuit (and national) 
majority view on the question persuaded her. In ruling that 
Twiqbal “plausibility” ought not to apply to affirmative defenses, 
the court relied on two core arguments, one textual and one 
functional.  
Textually, Judge Sammartino zeroed in on the syntax 
differences between Rule 8(a)(2), which addresses claims, and 
Rule 8(c)(1), which addresses affirmative defenses. As noted 
earlier, the former obligates claimants to plead a “short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”122 Conversely, Rule 8(c)(1) requires only that “a party 
must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”123 
To Judge Sammartino, this was a distinction with a difference. 
The Supreme Court’s linkage of the “plausibility” test to this Rule 
8(a)(2) “showing”/“grounds”/“entitlement-to-relief” triumvirate 
not only explained the origination of the test itself,124 but also 
served to distinguish it from other pleading rules (like Rule 
8(c)(1)) that contain none of those three terms. These 
                                                                                                     
Ameristar Fence Prods., Inc. v. Phoenix Fence Co., No. CV-10-299-PHX-DGC, 
2010 WL 2803907 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010). 
 120. Twiqbal Applied: Dion v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP, No. 11-
2727SC, 2012 WL 160221 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012); Yates v. Perko’s Café, Nos. 
C 11–00873 SI, C 11–1571, 2011 WL 2580640 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2011); J & J 
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Franco, No. CV F 10–1704 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 794826 
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011); Barnes v. AT&T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained 
Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2010); CTF Dev’t, Inc. v. Penta 
Hospitality, LLC, No. C 09–02429 WHA, 2009 WL 3517617 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 
2009). 
 121. Twiqbal Unresolved: Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Alvarado, No. 1:10–
cv–00907 LJO JLT, 2010 WL 4746165 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2010). 
 122. Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824, 
at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).  
 123. Id. at *2 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1)).  
 124. See supra notes 83–95 and accompanying text (discussing Twombly and 
Iqbal); see also Weddle, 2012 WL 1019824, at *2 (highlighting language 
differences between Rules 8(a)(2) and 8(c)(1)). 
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“differences in the plain language of Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 8(c),” 
concluded Judge Sammartino, “suggest that less is required for 
pleading affirmative defenses.”125 
Functionally, Judge Sammartino reasoned that concerns of 
practicality and judicial economy verified her decision not to 
apply Twiqbal. “Some of these considerations include the 
limited time a defendant has to prepare an answer to the 
complaint, avoidance of the need to repeatedly amend an answer 
to assert later-discovered defenses, and discouragement of 
motions to strike brought for dilatory or harassment 
purposes.”126 These responding-party considerations were not 
mirrored in claiming-party pleadings, and provided the court 
with a measure of corroborating justification for the Weddle 
opinion result. 
Together, these textual and functional concerns convinced 
Judge Sammartino to reject Twiqbal’s “plausibility” approach 
for testing the Athlon Sports/Bayer AG affirmative defenses: 
“Thus, the Court concludes that Twombly’s heightened pleading 
standard does not apply to defendants’ affirmative defenses.”127 
Without the Twiqbal modification, the incumbent Ninth Circuit 
standard, set by its Court of Appeals in 1979, would govern: 
“[t]he key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an 
affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the 
defense.”128 
In the time that has passed since Judge Sammartino 
rendered her decision in Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., at least 
fifty-five more district judges within the Ninth Circuit have 
issued Twiqbal decisions of their own on affirmative defenses. 
                                                                                                     
 125. Weddle, 2012 WL 1019824, at *2. 
 126. Id. at *3. 
 127. Id. Judge Sammartino’s reference to Twiqbal as a “heightened” 
pleading requirement may reflect her own impressions of the “plausibility” 
standard in operation, or her view of the standard’s contrast to the “no-set-of-
facts” formulation Justice Hugo Black coined in Conley v. Gibson. In either 
event, the reference would probably not be one the Supreme Court would 
embrace. Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007) (“[W]e do 
not apply any ‘heightened’ pleading standard . . . .”). 
 128. Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824, 
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (quoting Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 
824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
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But, unlike the modestly divided precedent Judge Sammartino 
confronted, the newer precedent points in a far more hopelessly 
divided direction. Twenty-three of those opinions joined her in 
rejecting Twiqbal’s application to affirmative defenses,129 
twenty applied Twiqbal to affirmative defenses,130 and twelve  
                                                                                                     
 129. Twiqbal Not Applied: Garity v. Donahoe, No. 2:11-CV-01805-MMD, 
2013 WL 4774761 (D. Nev. Sept. 4, 2013); Burton v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 
No. CV-F-13-0307-LJO-GSA, 2013 WL 4736838 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013); 
Pickern v. Chico Steakhouse, LP, No. 12-cv-02586-TLN-CMK, 2013 WL 4051640 
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2013); DC Labs, Inc. v. Celebrity Signatures Int’l, Inc., No. 12-
CV-01454 BEN (DHB), 2013 WL 4026366 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013); Pacific 
Dental Servs., LLC v. Homeland Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. SACV 13-749-JST (JPRx), 
2013 WL 3776337 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2013); Polk v. Legal Recovery Law Offices, 
No. 12-CV-0641-W-MDD, 2013 WL 3147728 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2013); 
Devermont v. City of San Diego, No. 12-CV-01823 BEN (KSC), 2013 WL 
2898342 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 2013); Vogel v. AutoZone Parts, Inc., No. CV-13-
0300-CAS (AJWx), 2013 WL 2395905 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2013); Diaz v. 
Alternative Recovery Mgmt., No. 12-CV-1742-MMA (BGS), 2013 WL 1942198 
(S.D. Cal. May 8, 2013); Vogel v. Linden Optometry APC, No. CV 13-0295 GAF 
(SHx), 2013 WL 1813686 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2013); Roe v. City of San Diego, No. 
12-CV-0243-W-(WVG), 289 F.R.D. 604 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2013); Kohler v. 
Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, No. 11-CV-2025-W-BLM, 2013 WL 544058 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013); Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., Nos. 3:11-CV-
00481-RCJ-VPC, 3:11-CV-00485-RCJ-VPC, 3:11-CV-00853-RCJ-VPC, 3:11-CV-
00854-RCJ-VPC, 2013 WL 499158 (D. Nev. Feb. 6, 2013); Palmason v. 
Weyerhaeuser Co., No. C11-695RSL, 2013 WL 392705 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 31, 
2013); Rapp v. Lawrence Welk Resort, No. 12-CV-01247 BEN (WMc), 2013 WL 
358268 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. North Am. Mktg. & 
Assocs., LLC, No. CV–12–0914–PHX–DGC, 2012 WL 5034967 (D. Ariz. Oct. 18, 
2012); Walker-Cook v. Integrated Health Res., LLC, Civ. No. 12–00146 ACK–
RLP, 2012 WL 4461159 (D. Haw. Aug. 10, 2012); Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan 
Maritime LLC, Civ. No. 08–00482 JMS/KSC, 2012 WL 3113168 (D. Haw. July 
31, 2012); G&G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Mitropoulos, No. CV12–0163–
PHX DGC, 2012 WL 3028368 (D. Ariz. July 24, 2012); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. 
v. Vargas, No. CV 11–2229–PHX–JAT, 2012 WL 2919681 (D. Ariz. July 17, 
2012); Figueroa v. Baja Fresh Westlake Vill., Inc., No. CV 12–769–GHK (SPx), 
2012 WL 2373254 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2012); Kohler v. Big 5 Corp., No. 2:12–cv–
00500–JHN–SPx, 2012 WL 1511748 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012); Figueroa v. 
Marshalls of Cal., LLC, No. CV11–06813–RGK (SPx), 2012 WL 1424400 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 23, 2012). 
 130. Twiqbal Applied: Figueroa v. Stater Bros. Mkts., Inc., No. CV-13-3364 
FMO (JEMx), 2013 WL 4758231 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013); ADP: Commercial 
Leasing, Inc. v. M.G. Santos, Inc., No. CV-F-13-0587-LJO-SKO, 2013 WL 
3863897 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2013); Nextdoor.Com, Inc. v. Abhyanker, No. C-12-
5667-EMC, 2013 WL 3802526 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2013); Vogel v. Huntington 
Oaks Del. Partners, LLC, No 2:13-cv-842-ODW(MANx), 2013 WL 3337803 (C.D. 
Cal. July 2, 2013); Gandeza v. Brachfeld Law Group, No. C 13-0810 SC, 2013 
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were inconclusive.131  
IV. A Survey of the Case Law Ruling on Twiqbal’s Applicability to 
Affirmative Defenses 
As this Article goes to press, more than 230 federal decisions 
have addressed the question of Twiqbal’s applicability to 
affirmative defenses in the period since the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
WL 3286187 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2013); Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., No. 
C 12-04936 LB, 2013 WL 31553388 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2013); Cabrera v. 
Alvarez, No. C 12-04890 SI, 2013 WL 3146788 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2013); 
Dodson v. Munirs Co., No. CIV. S-13-0399 LKK/DAD, 2013WL 3146818 (E.D. 
Cal. June 18, 2013); Dodson v. Strategic Rests. Acquisition Co., No. CIV. S-13-
0402 LKK/EFN, 289 F.R.D. 595 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2013); J & J Sports Prods., 
Inc. v. Barwick, No. 5:12-CV-05284-LHK, 2013 WL 2083123 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 
2013); Catch A Wave, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. C-12-05791-WHA, 2013 
WL 1996134 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2013); Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Pittsburg 
Wholesale Grocers, Inc., No. C-12-05523-WHA , 2013 WL 2009681 (N.D. Cal. 
May 13, 2013); Righetti v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections & Rehab., No. C-11-2717-
EMC, 2013 WL 1891374 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2013); Polo v. Shwiff, No. C 12-04461 
JSW, 2013 WL 1797671 (N.D. Cal Apr. 29, 2013); Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros., No. 
C-12-04590, 2013 WL 1786636 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013); Spears v. First 
American Eappraiseit, No. 5-08-CV-00868-RMW, 2013 WL 1748284 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 23, 2013); Ross v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, No. 2:12-cv-009687-
ODW(JCx), 2013 WL 1344831 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2013); Ansari v. Electronic 
Document Processing, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-01245-LHK, 2013 WL 664676 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 22, 2013); O’Sullivan v. AMN Servs., Inc., No. C–12–02125 JCS, 2012 
WL 2912061 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2012); Powertech Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 
No. C 10–945 CW, 2012 WL 1746848 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012). 
 131. Twiqbal Unresolved: Hernandez v. Creative Concepts, Inc., No. 2:10-
CV-02132-PMP-VCF, 2013 WL 4399235 (D. Nev. Aug. 16, 2013); Dodson v. CSK 
Auto, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00346-GEB-AC, 2013 WL 3942002 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 
2013); Intermountain Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Michael’s Manor, LLC,, No. 
4:12-cv-00645-BLW, 2013 WL 3944259 (D. Idaho July 29, 2013); Charter Oak 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Interstate Mech., Inc., No. 3:10-CV-01505-PK, 2013 WL 3809466 
(D. Or. July 23, 2013); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc., v. Dorsett, No. 12-CV-1715-
JAM-EFB, 2013 WL 1339231 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013); Fleming v. Escort, Inc., 
No. 1:12–CV–066–BLW, 2013 WL 870632 (D. Idaho Mar. 6, 2013); J & J Sports 
Prods., Inc. v. Bear, No. 1:12–cv–01509–AWI–SKO, 2013 WL 708490 (E.D. Cal. 
Feb. 26, 2013); Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., No. ED CV 11–1600 PSG (SPx), 2013 
WL 228501 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Catano, No. 
1:12–cv–00739–LJO–JLT, 2012 WL 5424677 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2012); J & J 
Sports Prods., Inc. v. Sanchez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74070 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 
2012); J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Romero, No. 1:11–cv–1880–AWI–BAM, 2012 
WL 1435004 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2012); Botell v. United States, No. 2:11–cv–
01545–GEB–GGH, 2012 WL 1027270 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). 
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decided the Iqbal case in May 2009.132 Plotting that case law is an 
instructive exercise, both because of what it informs and because 
practicing attorneys need ready access to this now highly 
localized federal practice standard. That survey reveals what 
certainly seems to be an emerging consensus, and that consensus 
favors the same outcome the court in Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp. 
embraced. This, perhaps, is one of the more truly fascinating 
aspects of Weddle—more than six years after Twombly was 
decided, the question Weddle tackled of proper affirmative 
defense pleading remains inconclusively resolved and still subject 
to not only circuit-by-circuit uncertainty but district-by-district 
(and, indeed, chambers-by-chambers) uncertainty.133 This 
frequently litigated Twiqbal spin-off issue has emerged as a 
paradigmatic trap for the unwary. 
                                                                                                     
 132. In the post-Twombly and pre-Iqbal period, it remained uncertain 
whether the Supreme Court intended its “plausibility” test to be given a 
constrained reach—for example, to govern pleadings only in antitrust cases, or 
inference-heavy cases, or complex and sprawling discovery cases. That 
uncertainty was resolved by the Court in its May 18, 2009 opinion in Iqbal, 
where it made clear that “plausibility” is to be used to govern the adequacy of 
complaints in all federal civil litigation. See supra notes 83–95 and 
accompanying text (elaborating on the progression from Twombly to Iqbal). 
Because the federal judiciary remained unclear on the reach of “plausibility” 
until Iqbal was decided, it seems prudent to begin the assessment of the courts’ 
treatment of “plausibility” in the affirmative defenses context from that date.  
To accommodate publication deadlines, the inclusion of new cases ended as of 
September 15, 2013. 
 133. See, e.g., CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Draper & Kramer Mortg. Corp., No. 
4:10CV1784 FRB, 2012 WL 3984497, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 11, 2012) 
(“[D]iffering opinions appear to have been rendered by courts sitting within this 
district alone.”); Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 565 (S.D. Cal. 
2012) (“Although the Ninth Circuit has not yet adopted the Twombly/Iqbal 
pleading standard for affirmative defenses [plaintiff] cites to several district 
courts that have . . . [defendant] directs the Court to at least one opinion from 
within this district that has declined to [do so].” (citations and footnotes 
omitted)); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Educ. Loans Inc., Civ. No. 11–1445 
(RHK/JJG), 2011 WL 5520437, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2011) (“[C]ourts within 
this district have reached inconsistent conclusions.”). 
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A. The Majority Trend Rejects Twiqbal for Defenses, but the 
Minority View Remains Substantial 
In writing one of these Twiqbal-to-affirmative-defenses 
opinions, it had become, over time, de rigueur for the deciding 
judge to start each decision by announcing that the “majority” or 
“most” of the nation’s courts hold the view that “plausibility” 
applies.134 Such incantations have diminished a bit of late, as 
newer court opinions seem to have noticed a change in that 
national trend,135 but those pronouncements of a pro-Twiqbal 
                                                                                                     
134. See, e.g., Herrera v. Utilimap Corp., Civil Action No. H–11–3851, 2012 
WL 3527065, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2012) (“A majority of District Courts have 
applied the heightened Twombly and Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses.”); 
EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., No. 1:11CV355–LG–JMR, 2012 WL 3242168, at *2 
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 7, 2012) (“A majority of courts have concluded that the 
plausibility standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal applies to the sufficiency 
of affirmative defenses.”); Weed v. Ally Fin. Inc., Civ. No. 11–2808, 2012 WL 
2469544, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2012) (“[T]he majority of district courts that 
have opined on the matter have concluded that the Twombly/Iqbal standard 
applies to affirmative defenses.”); Powertech Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., No. C 
10–945 CW, 2012 WL 1746848, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) (“[M]ost have 
found that the heightened pleading standard does apply to affirmative 
defenses.”); Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., Civ. No. DKC 11-2416, 
2011 WL 5118325, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011) (“The majority of district 
courts . . . have concluded that the Twombly-Iqbal approach does apply to 
affirmative defenses.”); EEOC v. Kelly Drye & Warren, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 
655(LTS)(MHD), 2011 WL 3163443, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011) (“[M]ost 
lower courts that have considered the question of the standard applicable to 
pleading of defenses have held that the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, as elucidated in 
Twombly and Iqbal, governs the sufficiency of the pleading of affirmative 
defenses.”); Shaw v. Prudential Ins. Co., No. 10–03355–CV–W–DGK, 2011 WL 
1050004, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2011) (“[T]he majority of district courts that 
have considered this question have determined that it makes sense to apply the 
Iqbal standards to affirmative defenses.”); Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean 
Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 2011 WL 98573, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011) 
(“Most . . . have found that Twombly/Iqbal should apply to affirmative 
defenses . . . .”). 
 135. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. 660, 662 (M.D. Ala. 
July 9, 2012) (“[T]he growing minority of district courts . . . have held that the 
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading standard does not apply to affirmative 
defenses.”); Figueroa v. Baja Fresh Westlake Vill., Inc., No. CV 12–769–GHK 
(SPx), 2012 WL 2373254, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2012) (“[N]umerous courts . . . 
have declined to extend the Twombly/Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses.”); 
Tiscareno v. Frasier, No. 2:07–CV–336, 2012 WL 1377886, at *14 n.4 (D. Utah 
Apr. 19, 2012) (“[A] growing number of district courts are declining to extend the 
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“majority” view continue to persist.136 The irony of these 
incantations lies with the national data itself.  The incantations 
are wrong. 
In the months immediately after the Supreme Court’s May 
2009 decision in Iqbal, only a modest majority of opinions favored 
the application of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses, and by 2011, 
the decided majority had shifted in the other direction.137 
Recently, a growing number of courts have sidestepped the 
controversy entirely, ruling that application of any standard 
would produce the same result (though those courts differ 
markedly on what that outcome would be).138 A charting of those 
decisions, by date and court, is appended to the end of this 
Article, followed by a reordering of that same data by district and 
deciding judge. In sum, that charting of the post-Iqbal case law 
on affirmative defenses looks like this: 
                                                                                                     
Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard to affirmative defenses, and it is unclear 
whether that approach is still a majority position.”); Paducah River Painting, 
Inc. v. McNational, Inc., No. 5:11–CV–00135–R, 2011 WL 5525938, at *2 (W.D. 
Ky. Nov. 14, 2011) (“[T]he district courts that have commented on it appear 
evenly divided.”); Willis v. Quad Lakes Enters., L.L.C., No. 4:11–CV–00096–
SWH, 2011 WL 3957339, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2011) (“A number of recent 
decisions have determined that the heightened pleading requirements in 
Twombly do not apply to affirmative defenses.”). 
 136. See, e.g., J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Barwick, No. 5:12-CV-05284-LHK, 
2013 WL 2083123, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2013) (“The vast majority of district 
courts have held that the standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal apply to 
affirmative defenses as well.”); Staton v. North State Acceptance, LLC, No. 1:13-
CV-277, 2013 WL 3910153, at *2 (M.D.N.C. July 29, 2013) (“[T]he majority of 
district courts have concluded that the particularity and plausibility standard 
from Iqbal/Twombly does apply to the pleading of affirmative defenses.”); 
Herrera v. Utilimap Corp., Civ. No. H–11–3851, 2012 WL 3527065, at *2 (S.D. 
Tex. Aug. 14, 2012) (“A majority of District Courts have applied the heightened 
Twombly and Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses.”); Gonzalez v. Heritage 
Pac. Fin., LLC, No. 2:12–cv–01816–ODW (JCGx), 2012 WL 3263749, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 8, 2012) (“The majority of district courts have held that the 
Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard applies equally to the pleading of affirmative 
defenses as it does to the pleading of claims for relief in a complaint.”); Weed v. 
Ally Fin. Inc., Civ. No. 11–2808, 2012 WL 2469544, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 
2012) (“[T]he majority of district courts that have opined on the matter have 
concluded that the Twombly/Iqbal standard applies to affirmative defenses.”). 
 137. See infra Appendix of Cases (collecting cases treating the issue). 
 138. See id. (delineating cases where Twiqbal was and was not applied). 










2009* 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 0 (0%) 
2010 10 (50%) 8 (40%) 2 (10%) 
2011 13 (21.3%) 42 (68.9%) 6 (9.8%) 
2012 10 (17.6%) 28 (54.9%) 14 (27.5%) 
2013# 30 (32.3%) 44 (47.3%) 19 (20.4%) 
Totals 66 (28.4%) 125 (53.9%) 41 (17.7%) 
* Since May 2009 (Date of Iqbal) 
# Through September 15, 2013 




Judges 49 (32.9%) 100 (67.1%) 
Total 
Opinions 66 (34.6%) 125 (65.4%) 
Thus, there is indeed today a national majority on the issue of 
Twiqbal’s applicability to affirmative defenses, but it is decidedly 
in the direction of refusing to apply “plausibility” to such 
pleadings.  If those opinions that sidestepped the issue are 
removed from the study, the resulting margin is more striking 
still—judges are rejecting Twiqbal for testing affirmative 
defenses by very nearly a two-to-one margin.  
The Weddle opinion was decided in the context of 
pharmaceutical and medical device litigation (albeit an atypical 
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variant on the normal drug and device type of dispute). That 
litigation section is a vibrant one,139 and examining one litigation 
section is also instructive. Here, in the pharmaceutical and 
medical device cohort of Twiqbal-to-affirmative-defenses cases, 
the issue has been explored only infrequently. Nonetheless, and 
though small, this industry-litigation cohort, too, and by a strong 
margin, favors the resolution Judge Sammartino chose.140  
                                                                                                     
 139. See generally William M. Janssen, Iqbal “Plausibility” in 
Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541 (2011) 
(discussing Twiqbal generally in this section’s litigation experience). 
 140. Eleven other district judges have joined Judge Sammartino in rejecting 
Twiqbal’s application to affirmative defenses in drug and device litigations. See 
DC Labs, Inc. v. Celebrity Signatures Int’l, Inc., No. 12-CV-01454 BEN (DHB), 
2013 WL 4026366, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013) (ruling that Court “will apply 
the more lenient ‘fair notice’ standard”); Pacific Dental Servs., LLC v. Homeland 
Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. SACV 13-749-JST (JPRx), 2013 WL 3776337, at *2 (C.D. 
Cal. July 17, 2013) (“[T]here is good reason to conclude that Twombly/Iqbal do 
not apply to affirmative defenses . . . .”); United States ex rel Health Dimensions 
Rehab., Inc. v. Rehabcare Group, Inc., No. 4:12-CV-00848 AGF, 2013 WL 
2182343, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2013) (view “more persuasive and consistent 
with the intent of all aspects of Rule 8”); Warren v. Tri Tech Labs., Inc., No. 
6:12-cv-00046, 2013 WL 2111669, at *7 n.7 (W.D. Va. May 15, 2013) (following 
fellow District judges in rejecting Twiqbal’s applicability); Vogel v. Linden 
Optometry APC, No. CV 13-0295 GAF (SHx), 2013 WL 1813686, at *2-*3 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 30, 2013) (applying incumbent Ninth Circuit “fair notice” standard, 
rather than Twiqbal); Senju Pharma. Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 297, 
303 (D. Del. Feb. 6, 2013) (“Due to the ‘differences between Rules 8(a) and 8(c) in 
text and purpose, [ ] Twombly and Iqbal do not apply to affirmative defenses,’ 
which ‘need not be plausible to survive.’”); Cadence Pharm., Inc. v. Paddock 
Labs., Inc., C.A. No. 11–733–LPS, 2012 WL 4565013, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 1, 2012) 
(rejecting the application of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses); Walker-Cook v. 
Integrated Health Res., LLC, Civ. No. 12–00146 ACK–RLP, 2012 WL 4461159, 
at *3 (D. Haw. Aug. 10, 2012) (“[C]ourts in this district have declined to extend 
the pleading standards in Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses.”); Ferring 
B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., Nos. 3:11–cv–00481–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00485–
RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00853–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00854–RCJ–VPC, 2012 WL 
607539, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2012) (declining to apply Twiqbal to affirmative 
defense); Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, Civ. No. 10–1045 
RMB/JS, 2011 WL 6934557, at *1 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (“[T]his Court agrees 
with those courts that have found Twombly/Iqbal inapplicable to affirmative 
defenses.”); Meas v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 11cv0823 JM(JMA), 2011 WL 
2837432, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2011) (“Although a close issue, the court 
concludes that affirmative defenses are not subject to a heightened pleading 
standard.”). In addition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 
likewise not applied Twiqbal to affirmative defenses, though its opinion on the 
issue never squarely confronts Twombly or Iqbal, and there is no certain 
indication that the precise question of Twiqbal’s possible application was ever 
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In surveying the full post-Iqbal national case law on the 
applicability of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses (and, more 
precisely, those cases that squarely ruled on the issue), one might 
catalogue the various approaches used by the district judges into 
three groups:  
1) “Plausibility” Governs: The Twiqbal “plausibility” 
approach applies, and is used by the court to test the 
pleading adequacy of affirmative defenses, in much the 
same manner as it would test a complaint; 
2) “Factual Notice” Governs: “Plausibility” does not 
apply, but affirmative defenses are nevertheless 
required to have a measure of factual detail in order to 
survive challenge; 
3) “Issue Notice” Governs: “Plausibility” does not apply, 
and a pleader is held solely to impart simple notice 
that the issue raised by the affirmative defense exists, 
without any further obligation to show how that issue 
is implicated under the case’s facts.141 
                                                                                                     
asserted by the parties. See Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 467–68 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (refusing to find waiver in a conclusorily pleaded statute of repose 
defense because “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a 
heightened pleading standard for a statute of repose defense”).  
Two judges have reached the opposite view, and held that Twiqbal does 
apply to the pleading of affirmative defenses. See Nixson v. Health Alliance, No. 
1:10–CV–00338, 2010 WL 5230867, at *2 (S.D. Ohio, Dec. 16, 2010) (applying 
Twiqbal to affirmative defenses); Castillo v. Roche Labs. Inc., No. 10–20876–
CIV, 2010 WL 3027726, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2010) (same).  
Another judge rejected the “plausibility” test, but seemed to apply Twiqbal’s 
“no-conclusions” instruction. See Odyssey Imaging, LLC v. Cardiology Assocs. of 
Johnston, LLC, 752 F. Supp. 2d 721, 725 (W.D. Va. 2010) (requiring sufficient 
facts be alleged for the court to conclude the pleader is entitled to relief).  
And three judges sidestepped the issue. See GN Hearing Care Corp. v. 
Advanced Hearing Ctrs., Inc., No. CV-WDQ-12-3181, 2013 WL 4401230, at *1 
(D. Md. Aug. 14, 2013) (“[E]ven assuming that the Twombly/Iqbal standard 
governs defenses, GN Hearing can acquire—and likely has acquired—the 
necessary facts through discovery . . . .”); United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS 
Caremark Corp., No. CIV-09-4672, 2013 WL 1755214, at *5 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 
24, 2013) (choosing not to “conclusively resolv[e] the debate”); Purdue Pharma 
L.P. v. Ranbaxy Inc., No. 10 Civ. 3734(SHS), 2012 WL 3854640 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 5, 2012) (“The Court need not enter this debate because Actavis’s defense 
satisfies the higher standard of Twombly.”). 
 141. See Vurimindi v. Fuqua Sch. of Bus., Civ. No. 10–234, 2011 WL 
3803668, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2011) (describing varying approaches); Tyco 
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The first of these views is readily described. It is Twiqbal 
unvarnished—the two-step path that disregards legal 
conclusions, and then assesses the remaining factual averments 
for “plausibility”—applied to test affirmative defenses.142 “Bare 
bones” or conclusory allegations will not survive such an 
inquiry.143 As one district court explained: when affirmative 
defenses set “forth conclusory legal statements wholly devoid of 
any supporting factual content,” they likewise fail to set forth 
“the nature of the asserted defense,” “violate Rule 8’s general 
pleading requirements,” and must be stricken.144 
The second view expresses a middle ground position. It does 
not require a “plausibility” assessment, but nor will it always 
tolerate a conclusory affirmative defense lacking any expression 
of factual relevance to the plaintiff’s claims. This view may also 
coincide with a particular circuit’s longstanding precedent that 
predates Twiqbal.145 Although courts vary in the nomenclature 
they use to describe this middle ground view,146 one court’s 
exposition is illustrative of the approach. That court tested an 
                                                                                                     
Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 899–901 (E.D. Pa. 2011) 
(same). 
 142. See supra notes 84–95 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s rationale in Twombly and Iqbal). 
 143. See Herrera v. Utilimap Corp., Civ. No. H–11–3851, 2012 WL 3527065, 
at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2012) (noting that affirmative defense that “merely 
recites the common law requirements, without facts in support,” is insufficient: 
“Without facts in support, a bare recitation of the elements does not reach the 
standard set in Twombly and must be struck”). 
 144. Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., Civ. No. DKC 11-2416, 2011 
WL 5118325, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011). 
 145. See EEOC v. Kelly Drye & Warren, LLP, No. 10 Civ. 655(LTS)(MHD), 
2011 WL 3163443, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011) (noting that in the Second 
Circuit, “[i]t has long been held that affirmative defenses that contain only ‘bald 
assertions’ without supporting facts should be stricken” (citing pre-Twiqbal 
authority)). 
 146. Indeed, some courts simply attribute this fact-pleading obligation to the 
“fair notice” requirement, without affixing a special title. See Dann v. Lincoln 
Nat’l Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 146 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[Defendant] has failed to 
provide [plaintiff] with fair notice of the nature of some of its defenses; [some] 
represent bare bones allegations that not only include no facts, but also fail to 
allege legal elements.”); United States v. Brink, Civ. No. C–10–243, 2011 WL 
835828, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2011) (asserting that circuit law mandates 
application of Twombly to affirmative defenses). 
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affirmative defense averring that recovery “is barred by the 
doctrine of estoppel by [plaintiff’s] own words and actions and 
upon which [defendant] relied and acted.”147 The court refused 
plaintiff’s invitation to examine this allegation’s “plausibility,” 
but then cautioned that this was “not a license for a responsive 
pleader to either plead a form-book list of affirmative defenses or 
plead those defenses so cryptically that their possible application 
will remain a mystery until unearthed in discovery.”148 Instead, 
the court explained, the responding pleading must include 
sufficient facts to be “contextually comprehensible”:  
Just as Rule 8 does not “unlock the doors of discovery for a 
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions,” the court 
should not construe and administer the Rules in a manner 
that forces the plaintiff to incur undue expense to discover the 
secrets of a contextually incomprehensible affirmative 
defense.149 
Though different from Twiqbal, the court noted that its 
“contextual comprehensibility” standard “will often produce the 
same result” as Twiqbal.150  
Notably, however, while the courts that embrace this second 
standard find that application of the “factual notice” test 
produces definitive results, they disagree on what level of notice 
the test commands. For example, one court, after announcing its 
intention to apply the standard, found that “boilerplate defenses 
that lack factual support” fail to meet the standard.151 Another 
court (from the same state, though a different district) found 
quite differently that austerely pleaded affirmative defenses 
“provide fair notice of the defense to Plaintiff.”152 
The third of these views asks merely if the plaintiffs are 
placed on notice of the legal type of affirmative defense they will 
                                                                                                     
 147. Odyssey Imaging, LLC v. Cardiology Assocs. of Johnston, LLC, 752 F. 
Supp. 2d 721, 727 (W.D. Va. 2010) (citations omitted). 
 148. Id. at 726. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 727 n.5. 
 151. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Catano, No. 1:12–cv–00739–LJO–JLT, 2012 
WL 5424677, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2012). 
 152. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Scace, No. 10cv2496–WQH–CAB, 2011 WL 
2132723, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2011). 
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be confronting. That an averment is “bare bones” or baldly 
conclusory is, to this group of courts, of no consequence because 
that is all the work that a responding pleader’s affirmative 
defenses are required to do. One such court’s treatment is 
illustrative of this approach. In denying a motion to strike several 
cursorily pleaded affirmative defenses, the court explained:  
[E]ach of Defendant’s affirmative defenses, though void of 
factual details, provide Plaintiffs with fair notice because 
Plaintiffs are now aware that the issue exists. Under the 
notice pleading standard, Defendant was obligated only to 
provide “knowledge that the issue exists, and not precisely 
how the issue is implicated under the facts of a given case.”153 
In other words, if the defending parties advise that they may be 
defending on the basis of time-bar, waiver, and release, the 
plaintiff has been told enough to meet the federal pleading 
standard.  
Which of these variations is the correct view, the one most 
faithful to the federal pleading regime set out by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure? To answer that question is to explore 
the competing considerations that drove the district courts to 
their various conclusions, and then to assess the merits of those 
analyses. To do so, the bifurcation Judge Sammartino adopted in 
Weddle—textual considerations and functional considerations—is 
a useful path. 
B. The Textual Argument Debate 
In her decision in Weddle, Judge Sammartino began her 
analysis with the text of the implicated Rules themselves. Of 
course, this is as it must be. The Rules must be given “their plain 
meaning” and, just like in statutory construction, when the Rules 
are found to be “unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.”154 
                                                                                                     
 153. Weed v. Ally Fin. Inc., Civ. No. 11–2808, 2012 WL 2469544, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. June 28, 2012) (citation omitted); see also Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic 
Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[T]he requisite notice is provided 
where the affirmative defense in question alerts the adversary to the existence 
of the issue for trial.”).  
 154. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) 
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The text of the Rule governing the pleading of a claim (Rule 
8(a)(2)) unquestionably differs from the text of the Rule governing 
the pleading of an affirmative defense (Rule 8(c)(1)).155 As Judge 
Sammartino correctly noted, the “showing”/“entitlement-to-relief” 
requirements for claim-pleading do not appear in the far more 
austere “affirmatively state” standard for defense-pleading.156 
Alone, this nonsymmetrical choice of language by the drafters of 
the two Rules would seem to counsel caution before giving a 
symmetrical interpretation to the two Rules’ application.157 That 
interpretative inclination has a venerable lineage in the 
analogous context of statutory construction.158 It would seem to 
apply with far stronger force here, where the Supreme Court, in 
its Twombly opinion, appears to explain (and justify) its 
“plausibility” test as expressing the correct interpretation of the 
“showing”/“entitlement-to-relief” mandate set out by the language 
of Rule 8(a)(2)’s claim-pleading requirement.159 It would stand to 
reason that because the affirmative defense requirements of Rule 
8(c)(1) omits this “showing”/“entitlement-to-relief” requirement, 
the Twiqbal “plausibility” test which emanates from precisely 
                                                                                                     
(quotations and citations omitted). 
 155. Supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text (discussing Judge 
Sammartino’s textual analysis of the Rules). 
 157. The District Court in Alabama made the point crisply in EEOC v. Joe 
Ryan Enters., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 660, 663 (M.D. Ala. 2012)  
If the drafters of Rule 8 intended for defendants to plead affirmative 
defenses with the factual specificity required of complaints, they would 
have included the same language requiring a “showing” of “entitle[ment] 
to relief” in the subsections governing answers and affirmative defenses. 
That Rules 8(b) and 8(c) contain no such language should end a court’s 
inquiry. 
 158. See Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 594 (D.N.M. 2011) (“[W]here 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 778 (2008) (citation omitted))); id. (“We 
refrain from concluding here that the differing language in the two subsections 
has the same meaning in each. We would not presume to ascribe this difference 
to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.” (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 
U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).  
 159. Supra notes 83–95 and accompanying text. 
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those requirements of a different Rule is likewise out of place. As 
one court resolved the point: 
Twombly and Iqbal did not introduce the requirement of 
showing entitlement to relief under Rule 8(a)(2), they 
interpreted it. . . . And they did this by interpreting language 
that is not present in Rule 8(b)(1)(A) [the general defenses 
rule]. This Court will not import that language, nor Twombly 
and Iqbal’s interpretation of it, to a different rule that lacks 
that language.160 
Not all courts have drawn the same meaning from this 
textual difference, however. Others, though conceding the textual 
differences, emphasize the ways in which the Rules are alike. 
Pointing to the requirement that all defenses be stated “in short 
and plain terms,”161 some courts have determined that this 
“short-and-plain” link to Rule 8(a)(2) is alone sufficient to trigger 
the “plausibility” requirement that Twombly announced.162 The 
applicability of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses, wrote one court, 
is the “the more reasoned view” and the one supported by “the 
text of the Federal Rules” because “[w]hile the language of Rules 
8(a) and 8(b) is certainly not identical, those sections contain 
important textual overlap with both subsections requiring a 
‘short and plain’ statement of the claim or defense.”163 
Presumably, for these courts, the obligation to plead a “short and 
plain” defense carries with it the same obligation required to 
plead a “short and plain” claim—namely, Twiqbal 
“plausibility.”164 In other words, the “plausibility” obligation 
                                                                                                     
 160. Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 2011 
WL 98573, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011). 
 161. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A). 
 162. See infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.  
 163. Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., Civ. Action No. DKC 11-
2416, 2011 WL 5118325, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011). 
 164. See Bank of Beaver City v. Sw. Feeders, LLC, No. 4:10CV3209, 2011 
WL 4632887, at *6–8 (D. Neb. Oct. 4, 2011) (explaining, but ultimately rejecting, 
the “short-and-plain” language similarity argument). See generally Dann v. 
Lincoln Nat’l Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 146 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (finding no need to 
conclusively resolve the Twiqbal debate, but noting that “when an affirmative 
defense omits a short and plain statement of facts entirely and fails totally to 
allege the necessary elements of the claim, it has not satisfied the pleading 
requirements of the Federal Rules”). 
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ought to be fixed as emanating from the common “short and 
plain” requirement (which is found in both Rules 8(a)(2) and 
8(b)), and not from the distinctive “showing”/“entitlement to 
relief” requirement (which is found in Rule 8(a)(2) only).165 
Although this contention is certainly not bereft of logic (i.e., what 
does it mean to allege “plainly”?), it is difficult to square with the 
Supreme Court’s apparent and repeated reliance in Twombly on 
the “showing”/“entitlement to relief” language in Rule 8(a)(2).166  
                                                                                                     
 165. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 166. This is not to say, however, that none have tried to square that view 
with Twombly. Professor Joseph A. Seiner has recently offered a thoughtful 
defense of this view. Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility Beyond the Complaint, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 987 (2012). For him, and even granting that “the Court 
certainly discussed the terminology of Rule 8(a),” Twombly and its reasoning 
hinged less on the syntax of Rule 8(a)(2) and more on practical considerations of 
discovery costs and the fairness of notice to adversaries. Id. at 1004. Professor 
Seiner correctly notes that the nation’s courts have long and often applied Rule 
12(b)(6) standards in testing Rule 12(f) motions to strike. See id. at 1004–05 
(“[M]any courts have treated a Rule 12(f) motion to strike an affirmative defense 
under a standard similar to that of a motion to dismiss a complaint.”). Mindful 
of that body of case law, and the Twombly Court’s emphatic rejection that it was 
installing a “heightened fact pleading” regime, Professor Seiner favors a unitary 
view of Twiqbal’s application: “To abruptly change course in light of Twombly—
and suddenly rely on the subtle distinctions in the language between the two 
rules, as many courts have done—seems inconsistent with prior precedent and 
the Supreme Court decisions.” Id. at 1006 (footnotes omitted). Professor Seiner 
may well be right: refusing to embrace a unitary application of federal pleading 
standards may seem precedentially inconsistent. It is hard, however, to read the 
Twombly Court’s repeated emphasis on Rule 8(a)(2)’s syntax otherwise. See, e.g., 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to 
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 
not do.” (emphasis added)); id. (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level” (emphasis added)); id. at 555 n.3 
(“While, for most types of cases, the Federal Rules eliminated the cumbersome 
requirement that a claimant ‘set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his 
claim,’ Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of 
entitlement to relief.” (emphasis added in part) (citation omitted)); id. (“Without 
some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could 
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the 
claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” (emphasis added)); id. at 557 
(“The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely 
consistent with) [an antitrust] agreement reflects the threshold requirement of 
Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough helft to ‘sho[w] that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.’” (emphasis added)); id. (“An allegation of parallel 
conduct is thus much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint; it 
gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but without some further factual 
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More interestingly still, both sides in this debate claim that 
the Official Forms support their construction. Because the Rules 
were first introduced into federal practice in 1938, the Official 
Forms have played a prominent illustrative role.167 Rule 84 
verifies that “[t]he forms in the Appendix suffice under these 
rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules 
contemplate.”168  
Official Form 30 depicts an “Answer Presenting Defenses 
Under Rule 12(b).”169 Courts holding that Twiqbal is not 
applicable to affirmative defenses often cite Paragraphs 4 and 6 
of this form, which conclusorily and in “bare bones” fashion 
announce: “4. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted,” and “6. The plaintiff’s claim is barred by 
the statute of limitations because it arose more than ___ years 
before this action was commenced.”170 That is the official 
illustration of the “simplicity and brevity” Rule 8(c) requires.171 
From this unadorned austerity, those Twiqbal-rejecting courts 
draw confirmation of their view: “the undetailed recitations of 
affirmative defenses illustrated in Form 30 show . . . [that the 
Rule 8(c)(1) requirement] is not an exacting standard even 
                                                                                                     
enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 
‘entitle[ment] to relief.’” (emphasis added)); id. at 569 n.14 (“Here, our concern is 
not that the allegations in the complaint were insufficiently ‘particular[ized];’ 
rather, the complaint warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to render 
plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.” (emphasis added in part) (citation 
omitted)); id. at 558 (“So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, 
could not  raise a claim of entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency should . . . 
be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the 
parties and the court.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); id. at 570 (“[W]e do 
not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a 
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” (emphasis added)).  
 167. See Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 
177, 181 (1958)  
We do not require detail. We require a general statement. How much? 
Well, the answer is made in what I think is probably the most 
important part of the rules so far as this particular topic is concerned, 
namely, the Forms. These are important because when you can’t define 
you can at least draw pictures to show your meaning. 
 168. Form 30, FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms. 
 169. Form 30 ¶¶ 4, 6, FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms.  
 170. Id. 
 171. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
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remotely approaching the type of notice required of a claim under 
Twombly and Iqbal.”172 If factual detail and specification were 
required, Official Form 30 would be violating the Rules—
something Rule 84 confirms is not the case. 
Yet, courts abiding by the view that Twiqbal applies to the 
pleading of affirmative defenses draw precisely the opposite 
message from Official Form 30. They rely not on sample 
Paragraph 4 (failure to state a claim) but on sample Paragraph 6 
(statute of limitations), and emphasize how that sample supplies 
additional language that seems to enhance the otherwise bald 
time-bar allegation: 
Form 30 . . . strongly suggests that bare-bones assertions of at 
least some affirmative defenses will not suffice, as the Form’s 
illustration of a statute of limitations’ defense sets forth not 
only the name of the affirmative defense, but also facts in 
support of it [namely, that “it arose more than __ years before 
this action was commenced”]. Given Rule 84’s focus on 
illustrating “the simplicity and brevity that these rules 
contemplate,” the additional factual detail contained in Form 
30 is hardly superfluous.173 
Not so, reason the Twiqbal-rejecting courts. They find such 
an interpretation of Official Form 30 belied by the distinction 
between facts and legal conclusions: 
The reference to a number of years has been interpreted by 
some courts as an elaboration of “facts” in support of the 
                                                                                                     
 172. Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900 (E.D. Pa. 
2011). Accord Tiscareno v. Frasier, No. 2:07–CV–336, 2012 WL 1377886, at *15 
(D. Utah Apr. 19, 2012) (“The fact that a simple statement that a complaint 
‘fails to state a claim’ is sufficient to plead an affirmative defense under the 
federal rules, even in the absence of additional factual allegations, suggests that 
the heightened Twombly/Iqbal standard was not intended to be extended to 
affirmative defenses.”); Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1258 (D. 
Kan. 2011) (quoting the same “fails to state a claim” allegation in the Official 
Form, and concluding “the brief and simple nature of this language indicates 
that no more detail is required of a defendant in an answer”); Lane v. Page, 272 
F.R.D. 581, 594 (D.N.M. 2011) (noting that “[t]he forms appended to the rules 
bolster the Court’s analysis that rule 8(b) does not require defendants to provide 
factual allegations supporting defendants” because “Form 30 provides no factual 
allegations in support of the defense, and form 30 is sufficient under the rules”). 
 173. Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., Civ. No. DKC 11-2416, 2011 
WL 5118325, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011). 
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defense. This is patently not the case. The language of the 
Form suggests stating that the action “arose more than __ 
years” before the case was commenced. The use of “more than” 
does not call for the pleader to state when the action factually 
arose; it only calls for the pleader to state the relevant 
limitations period governing the plaintiff’s claim. This is a 
legal conclusion, which is, again, insufficient under 
Twombly/Iqbal . . . . That both defenses listed in Form 30 
would be laughed out of court under Twombly/Iqbal impresses 
strongly against extracting the principles from those cases and 
applying them in the different context of affirmative 
defenses.174 
So, is there a “plain meaning” of Rule 8 and its subparts that 
answers the question of Twiqbal’s applicability to affirmative 
defenses? Both sides in the debate, fascinatingly, say yes. But 
that “yes” means a polar opposite conclusion for each.  
C. The Policy Argument Debate 
In her Weddle ruling, Judge Sammartino next considered the 
various functional considerations of applying, or refusing to 
apply, Twiqbal to affirmative defenses. Of course, as noted above, 
the analysis never reaches this level of inquiry (for anything 
other than mere collateral corroboration) if a court determines 
that the “plain language” of the Federal Rules is clear on the 
point.175 In either event, whether as core support for an “un-
                                                                                                     
 174. EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. 660, 664 (M.D. Ala. July 9, 2012) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 175. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text (discussing plain 
meaning construction of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Joe Ryan 
Enters., 281 F.R.D. at 663 (“[S]uch policy considerations are foreclosed when the 
language of the Rule is clear. The judiciary is commissioned to interpret the 
Rules as they are written, not to re-draft them when it may be convenient.” 
(citation omitted)); Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 566 (S.D. Cal. 
2012) (“Applying the same standard of pleading to claims and affirmative 
defenses, despite this clear distinction in the rules’ language, would run counter 
to the Supreme Court’s warning in Twombly that legislative action, not ‘judicial 
interpretation,’ is necessary to ‘broaden the scope’ of specific federal pleading 
standards.”); Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 
2011 WL 98573, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011) (“[P]olicy considerations may be 
compelling, but whether this Court agrees with them or not, it is first bound to 
apply the relevant rules of civil procedure as written.”). 
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plain” Rule text or as passing corroboration for a dictated 
conclusion, Judge Sammartino identified three such policy 
considerations in refusing Twiqbal’s applicability to the Weddle 
defenses: “the limited time a defendant has to prepare an answer 
to the complaint, avoidance of the need to repeatedly amend an 
answer to assert later-discovered defenses, and discouragement 
of motions to strike brought for dilatory or harassment 
purposes.”176  
Those considerations are often cited by other courts in their 
own opinions rejecting Twiqbal for affirmative defenses, but the 
list of relevant functional concerns does not end with these three. 
Over time, many other considerations have been offered as 
counseling against the application of Twiqbal to affirmative 
defenses: 
1) Defendant’s Time to Plead: While plaintiffs may 
possess a lengthy prepleading period for fact-gathering 
and legal research (bounded by the applicable statute 
of limitations), defendants ordinarily receive just 
twenty-one days to prepare and file their answer and 
affirmative defenses; 
2) Defendant’s Lack of Knowledge: Given this brief time 
frame, and the fact that the defendant may be seeing 
and reacting to the allegations of the plaintiff’s 
pleading for the first time, it is unrealistic to expect a 
defendant to learn the facts necessary to confirm 
“plausibility” in those twenty-one days; 
3) Waiver Risk: This diminished preparation time is 
exacerbated by the command that potentially case-
critical affirmative defenses be expressly (and 
appropriately) pleaded, or be deemed waived forever; 
4) No Counterpleading Obligation: In part, the 
“plausibility” detail required from plaintiffs is intended 
to facilitate the requirement imposed on defendants to 
counterplead, paragraph by paragraph, to the 
complaint’s allegations; in contrast, plaintiffs 
ordinarily need not (and, most often, may not) 
counterplead to the answer;  
                                                                                                     
 176. Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp., No. 11CV817 JLS (NLS), 2012 WL 1019824, 
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). 
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5) Ease of Fleshing Out Missing Details: Because 
affirmative defenses are necessarily directed against 
the plaintiffs’ claim, much of the factual support for 
those defenses will already be known to the plaintiffs, 
and what information they lack can readily be 
obtained through simple contention interrogatories; 
6) Judicial Intervention is Unnecessary: In typical cases, 
nonviable affirmative defenses do not require court 
culling; instead, their nonviability becomes quickly 
apparent and they are, thereafter, simply ignored by 
both litigants—thus, ratcheting up the defense-culling 
standard will add nothing but cost and delay to federal 
litigation; 
7) Goal of Ending Litigation Not Present: Holding 
complaints to the Twiqbal standard can permit the 
termination of federal litigation; conversely, striking 
an affirmative defense will rarely have that effect as 
the plaintiff’s claim will still continue on; 
8) Goal of Expediting Litigation Not Present: Were an 
affirmative defense stricken, it often will be without 
prejudice, to be replaced by a substituted averment in 
an revised answer; in such instances, the litigation is 
thereby retarded, not expedited; 
9) Goal of Avoiding Discovery Not Present: The plaintiff 
will have already opened the doors to federal civil 
discovery by filing the complaint, so the Twiqbal 
objective of endeavoring to avoid the opening of 
discovery will not be implicated; 
10) Goal of Disincentivising Extortionate Settlements Not 
Present: Baseless, implausible claims inject the risk of 
extorting settlements from nonculpable defendants 
who are forced into settling simply by the desire of 
avoiding prolonged, expensive, and disruptive 
discovery; a pending (though baseless and implausible) 
affirmative defense is unlikely to exert similar 
extortionate pressure; 
11) More Motions to Strike are Disfavored: Applying 
Twiqbal to affirmative defenses would invite the filing 
of more Rule 12(f) motions to strike, a result that 
competes with the long-held conventional view that 
motions to strike are disfavored time-wasters, to be 
granted only with great reserve; and  
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12) Plaintiff Protections Remain: Plaintiffs are not 
unprotected against frivolous affirmative defenses, 
since defendants have initial disclosure obligations for 
their defenses, and Rule 11’s mandate of veracity in 
pleading constrains wholly unfounded averments.177 
The court in Weddle mentioned functional considerations like 
these to validate the holding that Twiqbal does not apply to 
affirmative defenses. Courts that have ruled differently—finding 
that affirmative defenses must satisfy the Twiqbal “plausibility” 
test—have likewise supported their conclusions with functional 
considerations, including: 
1) Nonsensical Disparate Standards: Either as judicial 
policy or as an implement in the administration of 
justice, it makes no good sense to erect a national 
federal standard that sets one pleading norm for 
claimants and a different norm for defendants; 
2) Pleader Equality: Requiring Twiqbal “plausibility” 
makes success in pleading a degree more difficult, and 
if such an enhanced pleading obligation is to be foisted 
upon claimants, defendants, too, should have to labor 
under the same weight (after all, “what’s sauce for the 
goose . . . ”); 
3) As a Broad Pleading Principle, Pleaders Should Make 
Only “Plausible” Averments, Not Possible Ones: 
Mindful of Twiqbal, the goal of all federal pleading 
ought to be to impart enough notice to an opponent 
and the court of some “plausible,” factual foundation 
                                                                                                     
 177. See, e.g., EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., No. 1:11CV355–LG–JMR , 2012 WL 
3242168, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 7, 2012) (discussing functional considerations 
militating against applying Twiqbal to affirmative defenses); Floridia v. DLT 3 
Girls, Inc., Civ. No. 4:11–cv–3624 ,2012 WL 1565533, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 2, 
2012) (same); Cottle v. Falcon Holdings Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:11–CV–95–PRC, 
2012 WL 266968, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2012) (same); Bayer CropScience 
AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, Civ. No. 10–1045 RMB/JS, 2011 WL 6934557, at 
*1–*2 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (same); Bennett v. Sprint Nextl Corp., No. 09–
2122–EFM, 2011 WL 4553055, at *1–2 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2011) (same); 
Vurimindi v. Fuqua Sch. of Bus., Civ. No. 10–234, 2011 WL 3803668, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 29, 2011) (same); Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1257 
(D. Kan. 2011) (same); Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 
899–902 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (same); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 595–97 (D.N.M. 
2011) (same); Odyssey Imaging, LLC v. Cardiology Assocs. of Johnston, LLC, 
752 F. Supp. 2d 721, 725–26 (W.D. Va. 2010) (same). 
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for every pleaded assertion, and not merely a 
suggestion of an issue that may possibly apply in the 
litigation; 
4) “Plausible” Pleading Is Not That Hard: Importing 
Twiqbal should not radically alter how responding 
parties plead affirmative defenses; as with complaints, 
detailed, evidentiary pleading of facts will not be 
required, but instead only “enough” to “raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
evidence”178 to prove the allegations;  
5) “Plausibility” Cost Savings: One of the objects of 
“plausibility” in pleading is to cull from the dockets 
(and from the workload of all parties and the judicial 
system) the task of litigating issues for which no 
threshold factual foundation exists; by holding 
affirmative defenses to the same “plausibility” 
standard, both the court and the parties are saved the 
costs and labor of discovering and sorting through 
affirmative defenses that lack factual foundation; 
6) Same “Plausibility” Discovery Trigger on Defense 
Issues: Another object of “plausibility” pleading is to 
avoid embarking on unnecessary discovery; that goal is 
similarly achieved in the affirmative defense context, 
by shutting the door to potentially expensive discovery 
on affirmative defense issues until the “plausibility” 
line is first nudged passed; and 
7) Waiver Risk Can Be Minimized: If the defendant is 
unable to plead a not-yet-“plausible” affirmative 
defense, the defendant can seek (and should liberally 
receive) leave to amend to add the defense following 
the uncovering of its factual foundation in discovery.179 
                                                                                                     
 178. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
 179. See, e.g., Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., Nos. 3:11–cv–00481–RCJ–
VPC, 3:11–cv–00485–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00853–RCJ–VPC, 3:11–cv–00854–
RCJ–VPC, 2012 WL 607539, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2012) (discussing functional 
considerations militating in favor of applying Twiqbal to affirmative defenses); 
Paducah River Painting, Inc. v. McNational, Inc., No. 5:11–CV–00135–R, 2011 
WL 5525938, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2011) (same); Aguilar v. City Lights of 
China Rest., Inc., Civ. No. DKC 11-2416, 2011 WL 5118325, at *2–3 (D. Md. Oct. 
24, 2011) (same); Lucas v. Jerusalem Café, LLC, No. 4:10–cv–00582–DGK, 2011 
WL 1364075, at *1–2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2011) (same); Dann v. Lincoln Nat’l 
Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 145 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2011) (same); Nixson v. Health 
Alliance, No. 1:10–CV–00338, 2010 WL 5230867, at *2 (S.D. Ohio. Dec. 16, 
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Scholars, likewise, have taken opposite positions in this 
debate, some disfavoring the view that Twiqbal ought to apply to 
affirmative defenses, and some embracing that construction.180 
V. National Incoherence and the Practitioner’s Dilemma 
In drafting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the 
treasured aspirations of Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland, 
and their 1938 drafting compatriots was to establish of a uniform 
set of federal procedural standards that would become the settled 
practice rubric governing litigation in every federal court, be it 
Dallas, Detroit, Danbury, or Del Rey.181 While Clark and 
Sunderland tilt to no one in the magnificence of their 
achievement, the Federal Rules have never quite achieved that 
vision of true uniformity. The nationally divided precedent 
addressing Twiqbal’s application to affirmative defenses is just 
another chapter in that tale. 
                                                                                                     
2010) (same); Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 649–52 (D. Kan. 
Dec 22, 2009) (same).  The court in Oleksy v. General Electric Co., No. 06-C-
01245, 2013 WL 3233259 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2013), made its point with great 
emphasis in a recent patent dispute, noting how the defendant had raised “prior 
use” as both an affirmative defense and as a declaratory judgment counterclaim.  
The court reasoned, that it were to adopt the view that Twiqbal does not apply 
to affirmative defenses, “it would then be required to review the same factual 
allegations under two different standards and could potentially reach a result 
where it found the affirmative defenses were sufficiently pled but the 
counterclaim was not despite the fact they relied on the exact same factual 
allegations.”  Id. at *17.  
 180. Compare, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1360 (2010) (“[O]n both the doctrinal and the 
purposive level, Twombly-Iqbal applies only to claimants. The backup test of 
notice pleading instead applies to defendant’s pleadings, as it does everywhere 
else.” (citations omitted)), with Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility Beyond the 
Complaint, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987, 1003–04 (2012) (“In the end, however, 
this [Twiqbal-inapplicable] reading should fail in favor of a much broader 
interpretation of these decisions and the Federal Rules. This broader reading 
would apply the plausibility standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal to all 
pleadings, including the affirmative defense.”). 
 181. See Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1938–1958: 
Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 451 (1958) 
(expressing hope in “the real ideal of a uniform and natural procedure for 
courts”). 
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There is, today, a majority approach followed by more than 
sixty-seven percent of the federal judges who have ruled squarely 
on the issue (Twiqbal does not apply to affirmative defenses), but 
that somehow feels like cold comfort.182 The “majority approach” 
of a few years ago (at least as many district courts understood 
that “majority approach”) favored just the opposite view, the now 
minority view still retains a strong foothold, and the non-Twiqbal 
“factual notice” variant has done little to add stability and 
predictability into the affirmative defense pleading question.183 It 
is also weak solace for litigators and their clients when the 
interpretation of Rule 8(c)—and its very serious ramifications in 
actual litigation contexts—continues to vary not from circuit to 
circuit but from courtroom to courtroom. Although the lower 
federal judiciary is understandably awash in the uncertainty 
following the Supreme Court’s unveiling of “plausibility” pleading 
in Twombly and Iqbal, the fact that the courts are construing the 
very same textual language and still reaching entirely different 
interpretations of the same Rule offers little reassurance to those 
who must toil in the federal halls of justice. The result, for the 
bench, the bar, and scholars alike, inspires a shake of the head, 
not the awe of admiration. 
Much suffers under the current state of things. Certainly, 
clients (for example, J & J Sports Productions, Inc.) are numbed 
into derision by the comical inconsistency among what advertises 
itself to be a unified court system. Practitioners are resigned to 
the conclusion that while many aspects of federal practice are 
normalized, a great many others are not, and that Dean Clark’s 
hopeful vision of the genuine transportability of federal expertise 
from one district to another is often illusory. Jurists are 
condemned to an existence of unguided, island-like independence 
in which they are free not only to depart from the logic and 
reasoning of a distant colleague, but also from that of their lunch 
partner a chambers away down the hall. This may be judicial 
“percolation,” but it has little else to commend it. 
                                                                                                     
 182. See infra Appendix of Cases (discussing relevant case law). 
 183. See supra Part IV (recounting evolution in judicial views); see also infra 
Appendix of Cases (discussing relevant case law). 
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What Are Litigants To Do? 
Until this national incoherence is finally and conclusively 
resolved by an authoritatively precedential ruling or Rule 
amendment, there seem to be three obvious options: plead 
affirmative defenses in the traditional manner, attempt to plead 
“plausible” affirmative defenses, or postpone pleading all 
affirmative defenses and seek leave to amend later. None offers a 
very satisfying choice. 
Option 1: Plead Traditionally 
The first option is for the litigants to plead affirmative 
defenses as they always had. Preliminarily, it is noteworthy that 
this option still would not fully resolve the national incoherence 
on the proper pleading of affirmative defenses. Even historically, 
in the pre-Twiqbal environment, national uniformity was absent 
on the issue, but the disparity that existed (wide as it sometimes 
was) seemed limited largely to circuit-to-circuit differences.184  
This option likely supposes that the litigants (in courtrooms 
of first impression) propose to stand their ground and advocate 
against the importing of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses. The 
growing majority trend disfavoring Twiqbal’s importation 
certainly helps that cause, as does the strength of many of the 
Twiqbal-rejecting arguments. There is an indisputable textual 
difference between the pleading Rule for claims (Rule 8(a)(2)) and 
the pleading Rule for defenses and affirmative defenses (Rules 
8(b) and 8(c)).185 It seems plain that the Supreme Court relied 
heavily, at least in part, on the syntax of the claims-pleading 
                                                                                                     
 184. Compare Shechter v. Comptroller of New York, 79 F.3d 265, 270 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (finding that bald assertions of affirmative defenses are improper), 
with Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 Fed. Appx. 442, 456 (6th Cir. 2006) (approving the 
pleading of affirmative defenses in “general terms” as long as they afford “fair 
notice of the nature of the defense”), and Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 
362 (5th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that, “in some cases, merely pleading the 
name of the affirmative defense . . . may be sufficient,” but “baldly ‘naming’ the 
broad affirmative defenses of ‘accord and satisfaction’ and ‘waiver and/or 
release’ falls well short of the minimum particulars needed to identify the 
affirmative defense in question”). 
 185. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (noting the differences 
between Rule 8(b) and Rule 8(c)). 
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Rule in setting out the “plausibility” standard in Twombly.186 The 
interpretative jousting over the implications of Official Form 30 
inclines toward the Twiqbal-rejecting view.187 In weighing the 
functional considerations, the Twiqbal-rejecting view has 
formidable strength: claimants frequently enjoy a prepleading 
investigation period measured in years, whereas defending 
parties are limited typically to just twenty-one days;188 thus time 
constrained, defending parties must nonetheless timely and 
properly raise the defense or risk losing it;189 defending parties 
have a Rule 8 need for factual clarity to counterplead to a 
complaint, whereas claiming parties are usually barred from ever 
counterpleading to an answer;190 dismissing an unmeritorious 
claim ordinarily terminates the litigation, whereas striking a 
defense will rarely (if ever) have that effect, or even the 
advantage of materially shortening the case;191 the presence of an 
                                                                                                     
 186. See supra notes 85–91, 166 and accompanying text (discussing 
Twombly). 
 187. See supra notes 167–74 and accompanying text (discussing the impact 
of the official forms on the debate). 
 188. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A) (stating that answers must be filed 
within 21 days after service, but will be extended to 60 days if formal service is 
properly waived or to 90 days if sent outside the United States). See generally 
Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 596 (D.N.M. 2011)  
Plaintiffs can prepare their complaints over years, limited only by the 
statute of limitations, whereas defendants have only twenty-one days to 
file their answers. . . . Because a plaintiff can do a lot of pre-filing work, 
and a defendant generally cannot, there is a sound rationale for 
requiring more of plaintiffs than of defendants at the pleading stage. 
 189. See EEOC v. LHC Grp. Inc., No. 1:11CV355–LG–JMR, 2012 WL 
3242168, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 7, 2012) (“[T]he federal rules require defendants 
to assert any affirmative defense that may be applicable. Accordingly, 
defendants must assert defenses out of an abundance of caution to avoid the 
argument that meritorious defenses should later be considered waived.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 190. See Lane, 272 F.R.D. at 596 (“Whereas a defendant is deemed to admit 
the allegations in a complaint if he or she does not respond, a plaintiff may 
largely ignore an answer without formal legal consequence.”); Tyco Fire Prods. 
LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[W]hile there is a 
need for a more factual understanding of a claim as to permit the formulation of 
a response, a party served with an affirmative defense is generally not required 
or permitted to file any responsive pleading at all.”). 
 191. See Floridia v. DLT 3 Girls, Inc., Civ. No. 4:11–cv–3624, 2012 WL 
1565533, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 2, 2012) (“[W]hile a motion to dismiss can resolve 
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unmeritorious claim may induce an unwarranted settlement, 
whereas the presence of an unmeritorious affirmative defense is 
unlikely to have that effect;192 and the discovery floodgates are 
probably already opening by the time the answer is filed.193  
However one handicaps the strength of these textual and 
functional arguments, a litigant still confronts the severe 
consequences of misjudgment. The litigant may guess wrong, may 
misread the trial judge’s inclinations, or may fail to persuade the 
trial judge of the soundness of the Twiqbal-rejecting approach 
(who would then join the nearly thirty-three percent of the ruling 
judges who now insist upon only “plausible” affirmative defenses 
in their courtrooms). In such a case, the litigant may be left with 
an inadequately pleaded affirmative defense, soon to be stricken, 
                                                                                                     
a case, thereby avoiding discovery entirely, motions to strike only prolong 
prediscovery motion practice; as such, raising the standard for pleading 
affirmative defenses would only encourage more motions to strike.”(citation 
omitted)); Bennett v. Sprint Nextl Corp., No. 09–2122–EFM, 2011 WL 4553055, 
at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2011) (“[B]ecause the remedy for striking defenses at 
this stage of the litigation is often to allow amendment, applying the plausibility 
standard here would likely have little to no positive impact on the progression of 
the litigation.”). 
 192. See Bennett, 2011 WL 4553055, at *2 (“[I]t is unlikely that the prospect 
of having to engage in discovery related to a defense that the plaintiff believes to 
be baseless will motivate the plaintiff to settle their claim instead of fighting the 
defense they think is without merit.”). 
 193. See Tiscareno v. Frasier, No. 2:07–CV–336, 2012 WL 1377886, at *15 
(D. Utah Apr. 19, 2012) 
[I]t is plaintiffs’ submission of their initial complaint that invokes the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts in the first instance. The primary 
function of imposing a pleading standard on a plaintiff in the first 
instance is to ensure that ‘largely groundless claims’ are not made to 
‘take up the time of a number of other people. Affirmative defenses, on 
the other hand,,]do not invoke the jurisdiction of the court and screening 
them for efficiency purposes is not vital.  
(citations omitted); Vurimindi v. Fuqua Sch. of Bus., Civ. No. 10–234, 2011 
WL 3803668, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2011) 
[W]hile an insufficiently plead complaint may unfairly subject a 
defendant to expensive and time-consuming discovery, the converse is 
not true with regard to affirmative defenses, in that a plaintiff may 
easily explore a defendant’s affirmative defenses through contention 
interrogatories and other discovery. And, of course, a plaintiff who 
initiates litigation is less likely to be heard to lament the initiation of 
discovery in any event.  
(citation omitted). 
THE ODD STATE OF TWIQBAL PLAUSIBILITY 1627 
thereby confronting the very defense waiver the litigant must 
avoid. This first option, then, carries grave risks.  
Option 2: Plead “Plausibly” 
The second option is to assume that the Twiqbal 
“plausibility” standard will govern the pleading of affirmative 
defenses, and then endeavor to meet that standard. Indeed, that 
is what the defendants in the Weddle case appeared to be 
attempting with their enhanced pleading of the first and second 
affirmative defenses.194 Originally, they had alleged both their 
standing and innocent infringer defenses in bare bones, 
conclusory fashion, but then seemed readily able to revise those 
averments by supplying clarifying factual details.195 It is difficult 
to deny that the revised affirmative defenses impart better notice 
to Mr. Weddle than the original versions.196 To some 
commentators, this is among the most salutary disciplining 
functions that the very threat of Twiqbal serves.197 It prompts 
pleaders to add clarity. And sometimes, as the defendants in 
Weddle demonstrated, that factually enhanced pleading option is 
easily discharged. But only sometimes. 
In the other instances, where the defending litigants are, on 
the heels of the complaint’s arrival, just learning about the 
dispute for the first time, and then must meet a blisteringly quick 
turnaround obligation, the “plausibility” command is an 
                                                                                                     
 194. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text (discussing the amended 
answer). 
 195. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text (comparing the original 
and the amended answer). 
 196. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text (comparing the original 
and amended answers). 
 197. See James M. Beck, More Twiqbal Scholarship, DRUG AND DEVICE LAW 
BLOG (May 10, 2011, 12:26 PM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/ 
2011/05/more-twiqbal-scholarship.html  
[W]e think there’s more to TwIqbal than meets the eye—because we 
think that plaintiffs have themselves responded to TwIqbal by pleading 
more thoroughly than they used to. . . . In most cases plaintiffs can plead 
better . . . .  That’s one thing that TwIqbal is changing, whether or not a 
successful motion to dismiss results. 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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“untenable” one.198 For many litigants, this quick turnaround 
obligation may prove to be far less than twenty-one days; unless 
the served parties have counsel on-site or just around the block, 
and move swiftly to (a) appreciate the nature of the document 
served upon them, (b) forward the papers instantly to their 
counsel, and (c) rapidly assemble the personnel necessary to 
make factual sense of the allegations, it may be days or weeks 
before the litigants’ attorneys even can begin to strategize 
through the available affirmative defense permutations. That the 
litigants in this posture simultaneously confront the risk of 
waiver only makes the “untenable” situation worse. As one court 
concluded: “[A]pplying the concept of notice to require more than 
awareness of the issue’s existence imposes an unreasonable 
burden on defendants who risk the prospect of waiving a defense 
at trial by failing to plead it, and have a short amount of time to 
develop the facts necessary to do so.”199 This second option, then, 
may sometimes be a manageable one, but other times will prove 
catastrophic. 
Option 3: Plead Later 
The third option would reconfigure the pleading norms for 
affirmative defenses entirely. Fearing waiver by pleading un-
“plausibly,” but lacking both the time and the information to 
formulate “plausible” affirmative defenses, the defending 
litigants could decide to plead no affirmative defenses at all. 
Instead, they could pursue post-answer informal investigation 
and formal discovery, and upon marshaling all their affirmative 
defenses—now replete with “plausible” detail—they could seek at 
that later time leave (from their opponents or the court) to amend 
their answer to insert the new allegations. 
                                                                                                     
198. See Michaud v. Greenberg & Sada, P.C., Civ. No. 11–cv–01015–RPM–
MEH, 2011 WL 2885952, at *4 (D. Colo. July 18, 2011) (“[I]t is untenable to 
require a defendant to plead an affirmative defense with the same level of 
thoroughness required to state a claim for relief, considering the limited time 
frame to produce an answer.”). 
 199. Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (E.D. Pa. 
2011) (citations omitted). 
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The Rules certainly allow for post-answer amendments, and 
the standard for granting them professes liberality.200 
Commentators note that the prospect for such amendments could 
potentially cure the challenges that may arise from imposing the 
“plausibility” standard on affirmative defenses.201 Alas, 
uncertainties abound. 
Such amendments are permitted only through the 
beneficence of one’s opponent or the tolerance of the presiding 
judge. Prudent counsel would probably not rely on either, at least 
not as a prospective matter. Help from an adversary may be 
offered graciously, but contentious litigation settings create 
unpredictable behavioral dynamics such that opponent generosity 
would seem a dangerous thing to count on. Help from the court 
should come “liberally,” but here, too, circumstances intervene. 
Courts set schedules, press deadlines, and move dockets. Late 
amendments threaten all of these. Were a defending party to opt 
for this third option as a way to meet a “plausible” pleading 
standard for affirmative defenses, the presiding court would have 
to countenance routine post-answer amendments and their 
potential (likely?) incumbent risk of dooming the established case 
time-schedule. Even the commentators who see post-answer 
amendments as the antidote to “plausibility” complications 
impliedly acknowledge the uncertainty that delay injects.202 
                                                                                                     
 200. Rule 15 provides that, following a very brief, early period of amendment 
as of right, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s 
written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when 
justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). 
 201. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1274, at 314 (Supp. 2012) (“Given that the defendant may 
amend the answer to assert an omitted affirmative defense on the written 
consent of the adverse party or by leave of the district court, imposition of the 
plausibility standard is not overly burdensome. The defendant may state a 
plausible defense after facts become available.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 202. See  5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1271, at 607 (2004) 
[T]he liberal amendment of pleadings philosophy expressed in Rule 15 can 
be used by the parties and the district court to correct a failure to plead 
affirmatively when the omission is brought to light. A degree of diligence 
on the part of counsel is desirable in this regard so as to minimize any 
possibility of prejudice to the opposing party.  
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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Moreover, it is not altogether clear that the federal discovery 
procedures would even tolerate this maneuver as a canon of 
normal practice. The available scope of discovery under those 
procedures is, in most instances, defined by relevancy “to any 
party’s claim or defense.”203 In the case of suspected—but 
unpleaded—affirmative defenses, one could readily understand 
the fear that meaningful discovery into those potential defenses 
would meet with scope objections and be successfully resisted. 
This third option, then, is as treacherous as the first two. 
Which Option? The Diabolical Choice 
Among the defending litigants’ three options for asserting 
their affirmative defenses, none is safe and all are uncertain. The 
first risks waiver from the inadequacy of the pleaded affirmative 
defense. The second risks waiver from lacking the factual 
predicates to plead the affirmative defense adequately, and then 
having the resulting effort stricken as insufficient. The third 
risks waiver from postponing the pleading of affirmative 
defenses, and being later denied the chance for pre-pleading 
discovery or post-discovery amendment. Thus exists the 
unresolved question of Twiqbal applicability to affirmative 
defenses—the world in which J & J Sports Productions, Inc. 
found itself navigating for seventeen months in three 
jurisdictions.204 
What is the “right” answer to this nagging uncertainty, 
which bedevils the current practice of defensive pleading in the 
federal courts? From a cloistered perch in legal academia, all 
manner of opinions on that question can be volunteered—and 
each of them is likely to be grounded in some reason and logic. To 
my mind, Judge Sammartino and her colleagues in the emerging 
majority have the better of the argument. As she noted in her 
Weddle opinion, the language difference between Rule 8(a)(2) and 
Rule 8(c) is neither incidental or inconsequential.205 It is difficult 
to read Twombly as grounding the “plausibility” requirement in 
something other than the “show”/“entitlement to relief” language 
                                                                                                     
 203. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 204. See supra Part II (outlining the J & J litigation).  
 205. Supra Part III.  
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embodied in Rule 8(a)(2).206 Because that very language is 
missing from Rule 8(c), a fair interpretation of the “plausibility” 
requirement (at least as it has emanated from Twombly) would 
seem to foreclose its applicability to affirmative defenses. This 
would not seem to lie within the fair ambit of broad judicial 
discretion; rather, it seems to be the only sound interpretation of 
Twombly’s analysis and associated logic. Under the “plain 
reading” standard for Rule construction (engrafted from 
longstanding statutory construction principles), that likely ends 
the analysis.207 
Judge Sammartino continued, however, to examine the 
underlying functional policies to (seemingly) validate her 
conclusion. Although that excursion is perhaps unnecessary, it is 
difficult to quarrel with her inclinations and those of her like-
minded colleagues among the federal district courts. Plaintiffs 
often do enjoy a longer pre-pleading investigation period (perhaps 
nearly as long as the full duration of the applicable limitations 
period), whereas defending parties are limited to only twenty-one 
days in most cases for their counterpleading.208 Holding claiming 
parties to a higher standard of pleading specificity than 
defending parties aligns with the obligation of defending parties 
to counterplead in response (something very infrequently 
expected—or even tolerated—of claiming parties).209 Plaintiffs are 
likely to have a greater command of the factual predicates 
to understand most defenses, whereas defending parties may be 
learning, for the first time, of the incident giving rise to the 
lawsuit with the service of the complaint, with very little time to 
accomplish a great deal of pre-pleading investigation.210 The 
specter of claim-based extortionate settlements would seem 
meaningfully less pronounced with affirmative defenses: it seems 
unlikely that any plaintiff is going to be frightened into an 
                                                                                                     
 206. Supra notes 166 and accompanying text. 
 207. Supra notes 97, 122–25 and accompanying text. 
 208. Supra notes 188, 200 and accompanying text. 
 209. Supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (noting that the plaintiff 
often has far more time to investigate prior to filing a complaint than the 
defendant will have in the days between receiving the complaint and filing a 
response). 
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unmerited settlement by the presence of a conclusorily pleaded 
affirmative defense.211 And defending parties face the numbing 
risk of waiver from unpleaded affirmative defenses.212 It would be 
desirable (and helpful) if defending parties could, and indeed did, 
plead with more factual precision in their affirmative defenses. 
But that is not what the terms of Rule 8(c) require, nor what the 
practical realities of defensive pleading often allow.  
Perhaps, though, the “right” answer to resolving this Twiqbal 
interpretative uncertainty needs to be appreciated at a much 
more practical level. At some point, it might not matter what the 
“right” interpretation of Rule 8(c) is quite as much as it matters 
what the “wrong” interpretation is. The transcending problem 
today is that there is no uniform national answer (and, indeed, 
not even a reliable regional answer, circuit answer, or district 
answer) to this question. For a unified federal judiciary, that is a 
serious defect and, given the enormous ramifications of 
inadequate affirmative defense pleading, a potentially calamitous 
one. So, perhaps it is most precise to say simply that the “right” 
interpretation of Rule 8(c) is the one that everyone is obliged to 
follow as a uniform national approach, with accompanying 
procedural safeguards installed to ensure that justice is done.213 
Of course, this national debate on the proper interpretation 
of Rule 8(c) could be readily abated by amending the federal 
rules, but here, too, many of these same concerns would confound 
that process. Perhaps the drafters could revise Rule 15 to make 
explicit that defending parties are entitled to proceed through 
discovery (or at least a fair measure of it) with unpleaded 
affirmative defenses, and then have a clear Rule-based assurance 
of their right to add factually “plausible” affirmative defenses 
                                                                                                     
 211. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the differing risks 
attached to different types of conclusory pleadings). 
 212. Supra notes 189, 199 and accompanying text. 
 213. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do 
justice.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . should be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.”).  Thus, for example, there might be an express national 
rejection of “plausibility” for pleading affirmative defenses, either by the 
Supreme Court or through rulemaking, or alternatively, the unfortunate but 
necessary acceptance of a broad period for permissive amendments to Rule 8(c) 
answers to accommodate post-discovery affirmative defense additions. 
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later by amendment. This seems an unlikely solution. It would 
require a meaningful broadening of the scope of authorized 
federal discovery,214 and it could send the process of trial 
scheduling spiraling into the realm of constant uncertainty as 
claiming parties, who now confront entirely new, belatedly added 
affirmative defenses, insist on equal time to explore those 
additions and to endeavor to marshal the evidence necessary to 
meet those new defenses at trial. No Rules revision fix is likely to 
be entirely satisfying. 
In the meanwhile, what is the cautious practitioner to do? 
There is, of course, the rare possibility that the particular judge 
before whom the litigant will be appearing has already taken 
sides in this debate. Readers are reminded how this Article’s 
national survey verified that views on this issue differ at the 
highly-local, chambers-by-chambers level. Nevertheless, a perfect 
match is certainly not out of the question. To aid in that search, 
the Appendix of Cases that now concludes this Article endeavors 
to provide a comprehensive cataloguing of the Nation’s district 
court decisions on the Twiqbal-to-affirmative-defenses issue since 
the Iqbal decision was released in May 2009 through September 
15, 2013. In the end, that is the only nearly215 reliable option 
available to defending parties as they labor over how to plead. 
Unsatisfying to be sure, but it is the odd state of Twiqbal 
“plausibility” in pleading affirmative defenses.  
                                                                                                     
 214. Federal civil litigants are now permitted, as a usual matter, to discover 
“any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Because a contemplated but as yet unpleaded affirmative 
defense would not qualify as “any party’s claim or defense,” discovery pursuing 
it would likely be objectionable unless Rule 26(b)(1) were revised to expressly 
tolerate discovery on such possible but un-alleged defenses. 
 215. A district judge is likely always free, upon considerations of new 
briefing or more recent developments and trends in the law, to depart from an 
earlier position on how Rule 8(c) affirmative defenses ought to be pleaded. See, 
e.g., Polo v. Shwiff, No. C-12-04461-JSW, 2013 WL 1797671, at *4–*5 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 29, 2013) (noting the Court’s own original rejection of Twiqbal for 
affirmative defenses, but now, “[a]fter careful consideration, the Court has been 
persuaded by the reasoning of those courts that apply Twombly and Iqbal to 
affirmative defenses, and it shall evaluate the sufficiency of Defendants’ 
affirmative defenses under that standard.”). 
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VI. Conclusion 
The majority view held by the Nation’s district courts that 
have considered the question join Weddle v. Bayer AG Corp. in 
concluding that Twiqbal “plausibility” does not apply to the 
pleading of affirmative defenses. Some among that majority, 
however, impose a fact-sensitive interpretation of notice pleading 
that seems nonetheless to require a measure of enhanced detail. 
The persistent minority view (formerly the majority approach, 
just a few years back) holds that Twiqbal applies.  
Where does this leave the practitioner? Perhaps Alice B. 
Toklas, life-mate to Gertrude Stein and author of two cookbooks, 
got it right when she observed, “What’s sauce for the goose may 
be sauce for the gander. But it’s not necessarily sauce for the 
chicken, the duck, the turkey or the guinea hen.”216 Or perhaps 
that’s not exactly quite right. Maybe, as here, whether goose 
sauce ought to be seasoned differently than gander sauce depends 
on where the kitchen is and on who’s doing the cooking. 
  
                                                                                                     
 216. Obituary, Alice Toklas, 89, Is Dead In Paris, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1967, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/05/03/specials/stein-toklasobit.ht 
ml (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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